In the Thick of Moral Motivation

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):433-453 (2017)
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Abstract

We accomplish three things in this paper. First, we provide evidence that the motivational internalism/externalism debate in moral psychology could be a false dichotomy born of ambiguity. Second, we provide further evidence for a crucial distinction between two different categories of belief in folk psychology: thick belief and thin belief. Third, we demonstrate how careful attention to deep features of folk psychology can help diagnose and defuse seemingly intractable philosophical disagreement in metaethics.

Author Profiles

John Turri
University of Waterloo
Wesley Buckwalter
George Mason University

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