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  1. added 2019-05-14
    The Complementarity of Mindshaping and Mindreading.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):533-549.
    Why do we engage in folk psychology, that is, why do we think about and ascribe propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions etc. to people? On the standard view, folk psychology is primarily for mindreading, for detecting mental states and explaining and/or predicting people’s behaviour in terms of them. In contrast, McGeer (1996, 2007, 2015), and Zawidzki (2008, 2013) maintain that folk psychology is not primarily for mindreading but for mindshaping, that is, for moulding people’s behavior and minds (e.g., (...)
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  2. added 2019-04-12
    Justification, Conversation, and Folk Psychology.Víctor Fernandez Castro - 2019 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 34 (1):73-88.
    The aim of this paper is to offer a version of the so-called conversational hypothesis of the ontogenetic connection between language and mindreading (Harris 1996, 2005; Van Cleave and Gauker 2010; Hughes et al. 2006). After arguing against a particular way of understanding the hypothesis (the communicative view), I will start from the justificatory view in philosophy of social cognition (Andrews 2012; Hutto 2004; Zawidzki 2013) to make the case for the idea that the primary function of belief and desire (...)
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  3. added 2019-03-26
    Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places?Kristin Andrews - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (5):521-536.
    : I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's theoretical commitments should lead them to (...)
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  4. added 2019-02-23
    Do Our Automated Unconscious Behaviors Reveal Our Real Selves and Hidden Truths About the Universe? -- A Review of David Hawkins ‘Power Vs Force--The Hidden Determinants of Human Behavior –Author’s Official Authoritative Edition’ 412p (2012)(Original Edition 1995)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century -- Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 4th Edition Michael Starks. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 353-357.
    I am very used to strange books and special people, but Hawkins stands out due to his use of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the “truth” of any kind of statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the person being tested believes it, but whether it is really true! What is well known is that people will show automatic, unconscious physiological and psychological responses to just about anything they are exposed to—images, sounds, touch, odors, ideas, (...)
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  5. added 2019-02-23
    Review of Wittgenstein And Psychology- A Practical Guide by Harre and Tissaw (2005)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 309-324.
    A major flaw of the book is its failure to note Wittgenstein’s role in destroying the mechanical or reductionist or computationalist view of mind. These continue to dominate cognitive science and philosophy, in spite of the fact that they were powerfully countered by W and later by Searle and others. -/- There is much talk of W’s use of terms like “grammar”, “rules” etc. but never a clear mention that they mean our Evolved Psychology or our genetically programmed innate behavior. (...)
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  6. added 2018-05-21
    Pučka psihologija: znanstvene perspektive realizma, eliminativizma i instrumentalizma.Marin Biondić - 2017 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 37 (3):559-578.
    U radu analiziram realisticki, eliminativisticki i instrumentalisticki pristup prema mental­nom diskursu pucke psihologije. Temeljna ideja razmatranje je pucke psihologije kao teorije koja objasnjava i predviđa ponasanje. Ako je pucka psihologija teorija, onda se mora moći reducirati na ili inkorporirati u dobro ucvrscene znanstvene fizikalne teorije, neuroznanost prvenstveno. Pitanje je, je li tako nesto barem principijelno moguce? Trebamo li ocekivati znanstvenu redukciju entiteta pucke psihologije ili je realno za ocekivati njenu eliminaciju iz znanstvenog objasnjenja i predviđanja ponasanja utoliko, ukoliko se ne (...)
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  7. added 2018-05-02
    A Dispositional Account of Aversive Racism.Carole J. Lee - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Cognitive Science Society.
    I motivate and articulate a dispositional account of aversive racism. By conceptualizing and measuring attitudes in terms of their full distribution, rather than in terms of their mode or mean preference, my account of dispositional attitudes gives ambivalent attitudes (qua attitude) the ability to predict aggregate behavior. This account can be distinguished from other dispositional accounts of attitude by its ability to characterize ambivalent attitudes such as aversive racism at the attitudinal rather than the sub-attitudinal level and its deeper appreciation (...)
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  8. added 2017-11-17
    Proceedings of the Workshop 'Reasoning About Other Minds: Logical and Cognitive Perspectives.J. van Eijck & R. Verbrugge (eds.) - 2011 - WEUR Proceedings.
    In recent years, the human ability to reasoning about mental states of others in order to explain and predict their behavior has come to be a highly active area of research. Researchers from a wide range of fields { from biology and psychology through linguistics to game theory and logic{ contribute new ideas and results. This interdisciplinary workshop, collocated with the Thirteenth International Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XIII), aims to shed light on models of social (...)
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  9. added 2017-10-30
    Encapsulated Social Perception of Emotional Expressions.Joulia Smortchkova - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 47:38-47.
    In this paper I argue that the detection of emotional expressions is, in its early stages, informationally encapsulated. I clarify and defend such a view via the appeal to data from social perception on the visual processing of faces, bodies, facial and bodily expressions. Encapsulated social perception might exist alongside processes that are cognitively penetrated, and that have to do with recognition and categorization, and play a central evolutionary function in preparing early and rapid responses to the emotional stimuli.
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  10. added 2017-09-18
    Stereotypes, Theory of Mind, and the Action–Prediction Hierarchy.Evan Westra - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2821-2846.
    Both mindreading and stereotyping are forms of social cognition that play a pervasive role in our everyday lives, yet too little attention has been paid to the question of how these two processes are related. This paper offers a theory of the influence of stereotyping on mental-state attribution that draws on hierarchical predictive coding accounts of action prediction. It is argued that the key to understanding the relation between stereotyping and mindreading lies in the fact that stereotypes centrally involve character-trait (...)
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  11. added 2017-04-12
    Character and Theory of Mind: An Integrative Approach.Evan Westra - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1217-1241.
    Traditionally, theories of mindreading have focused on the representation of beliefs and desires. However, decades of social psychology and social neuroscience have shown that, in addition to reasoning about beliefs and desires, human beings also use representations of character traits to predict and interpret behavior. While a few recent accounts have attempted to accommodate these findings, they have not succeeded in explaining the relation between trait attribution and belief-desire reasoning. On my account, character-trait attribution is part of a hierarchical system (...)
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  12. added 2017-04-07
    Beyond ‘Interaction’: How to Understand Social Effects on Social Cognition.Julius Schönherr & Evan Westra - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):27-52.
    In recent years, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have advocated for an ‘interactive turn’ in the methodology of social-cognition research: to become more ecologically valid, we must design experiments that are interactive, rather than merely observational. While the practical aim of improving ecological validity in the study of social cognition is laudable, we think that the notion of ‘interaction’ is not suitable for this task: as it is currently deployed in the social cognition literature, this notion leads to (...)
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  13. added 2017-04-03
    Do You See What I See? How Social Differences Influence Mindreading.Spaulding Shannon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4009-4030.
    Disagreeing with others about how to interpret a social interaction is a common occurrence. We often find ourselves offering divergent interpretations of others’ motives, intentions, beliefs, and emotions. Remarkably, philosophical accounts of how we understand others do not explain, or even attempt to explain such disagreements. I argue these disparities in social interpretation stem, in large part, from the effect of social categorization and our goals in social interactions, phenomena long studied by social psychologists. I argue we ought to expand (...)
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  14. added 2017-03-01
    Telling Stories Without Words.Kristin Andrews - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.
    In this review article of Dan Hutto's bok Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons, I argue that we can take a functional approach to FP that identifies it with the practice of explaining behaviour -- that is, we can understand folk psychology as having the purpose of explaining behaviour and promoting social cohesion by making others’ behaviour comprehensible, without thinking that this ability must be limited to those with linguistic abilities. One reason for thinking that language must (...)
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  15. added 2016-10-22
    Review of Wittgensteins Metaphilosophy by Paul Horwich (2013).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my view they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior(psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a nutshell, (...)
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  16. added 2016-10-22
    Review of Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock Ed (2007).Michael Starks - 2017
    On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death and has only recently begun to draw serious attention. I cannot recall a single reference to it in all of Searle and one sees whole books on W with barely a mention. There are however xlnt books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and others and parts of many other books and articles, but hands down the best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding Wittgenstein’s (...)
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  17. added 2016-10-21
    Review of Ludwig Wittgenstein by Edward Kanterian (2007).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    Overall, it is first rate with accurate, sensitive and penetrating accounts of his life and thought in roughly chronological order, but, inevitably (ie, like everyone else) it fails, in my view, to place his work in proper context and gets some critical points wrong. It is not made clear that philosophy is armchair psychology and that W was a pioneer in what later became cognitive or evolutionary psychology. One would not surmise from this book that he laid out the foundations (...)
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  18. added 2016-07-12
    Spontaneous Mindreading: A Problem for the Two-Systems Account.Evan Westra - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4559-4581.
    According to the two-systems account of mindreading, our mature perspective-taking abilities are subserved by two distinct mindreading systems: a fast but inflexible, “implicit” system, and a flexible but slow “explicit” one. However, the currently available evidence on adult perspective-taking does not support this account. Specifically, both Level-1 and Level-2 perspective-taking show a combination of efficiency and flexibility that is deeply inconsistent with the two-systems architecture. This inconsistency also turns out to have serious consequences for the two-systems framework as a whole, (...)
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  19. added 2016-05-08
    If the Motor System is No Mirror'.Maria Brincker - 2012 - In Payette (ed.), Connected Minds: Cognition and Interaction in the Social World. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 158--182.
    Largely aided by the neurological discovery of so-called “ mirror neurons,” the attention to motor activity during action observation has exploded over the last two decades. The idea that we internally “ mirror ” the actions of others has led to a new strand of implicit simulation theories of action understanding[1][2]. The basic idea of this sort of simulation theory is that we, via an automatic covert activation of our own action representations, can understand the action and possibly the goal (...)
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  20. added 2016-03-09
    Morality Without Mindreading.Susana Monsó - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):338-357.
    Could animals behave morally if they can’t mindread? Does morality require mindreading capacities? Moral psychologists believe mindreading is contingently involved in moral judgements. Moral philosophers argue that moral behaviour necessarily requires the possession of mindreading capacities. In this paper, I argue that, while the former may be right, the latter are mistaken. Using the example of empathy, I show that animals with no mindreading capacities could behave on the basis of emotions that possess an identifiable moral content. Therefore, at least (...)
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  21. added 2016-02-28
    Extended Cognition and the Space of Social Interaction.Joel Krueger - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):643-657.
    The extended mind thesis (EM) asserts that some cognitive processes are (partially) composed of actions consisting of the manipulation and exploitation of environmental structures. Might some processes at the root of social cognition have a similarly extended structure? In this paper, I argue that social cognition is fundamentally an interactive form of space management—the negotiation and management of ‘‘we-space”—and that some of the expressive actions involved in the negotiation and management of we-space (gesture, touch, facial and whole-body expressions) drive basic (...)
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  22. added 2016-02-25
    Personality Model.Miro Brada - 2000 - Problem Paradise:42-43.
    In 1995, as a student of psychology inspired by natural science, I defined a logical model of personality explaining psychosis. I created (for my MA thesis, 1998 and grant research, 1999) new kind of tests assessing intelligence, creativity, prejudices, expectations to show more exact methods in psychology. During my Phd study in economics, I developed 'Maximization of Uniqueness (Originality)' model enhancing the classic utility to explain irrational motivations linking economics and psychology. Later I became computer programmer developing functional programming. According (...)
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  23. added 2016-01-24
    Autism Spectrum and Cheaters Detection.Miguel Lopez Astorga - 2014 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 7 (1):1-10.
    Rutherford and Ray think that human beings have mental mechanisms that help them to detect individuals that, deliberately, do not follow a rule. In the same way, they hold that autism is not a disorder in which these mechanisms are damaged. This idea seems contrary to the thesis, supported by some researchers, that autistic people have a theory of mind deficit. This is because of, if Rutherford and Ray are right, autistic people can detect other people’s intentions. In this paper, (...)
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  24. added 2015-11-11
    Theory of Mind and Mentalizing Ability in Antisocial Personality Disorders with and Without Psychopathy.M. Dolan & R. Fullam - 2004 - Psychological Medicine 34:1093–1102.
    Background. The literature on Theory of Mind (ToM) in antisocial samples is limited despite evidence that the neural substrates of theory of mind task involve the same circuits implicated in the pathogenesis of antisocial behaviour. Method. Eighty-nine male DSM-IV Antisocial Personality Disordered subjects (ASPDs) and 20 controls (matched for age and IQ) completed a battery of ToM tasks. The ASPD group was categorized into psychopathic and non-psychopathic groups based on a cut-off score of 18 on the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version. (...)
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  25. added 2015-09-11
    Empathy and Morality in Behaviour Readers.Susana Monsó - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (5):671-690.
    It is tempting to assume that being a moral creature requires the capacity to attribute mental states to others, because a creature cannot be moral unless she is capable of comprehending how her actions can have an impact on the well-being of those around her. If this assumption were true, then mere behaviour readers could never qualify as moral, for they are incapable of conceptualising mental states and attributing them to others. In this paper, I argue against such an assumption (...)
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  26. added 2015-07-20
    Navigating Beyond “Here & Now” Affordances—on Sensorimotor Maturation and “False Belief” Performance.Maria Brincker - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called implicit false belief (FB) tasks but do not show such capacities on traditional explicit FB tasks. I propose a navigational approach, which offers a hitherto ignored way of making sense of the seemingly contradictory results. The proposal involves a distinction between how we navigate FBs as (...)
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  27. added 2015-07-20
    Il test della falsa credenza.Marco Fenici - 2013 - Analytical and Philosophical Explanation 8:1-56.
    La ricerca empirica nelle scienze cognitive può essere di supporto all’indagine filosofica sullo statuto ontologico e epistemologico dei concetti mentali, ed in particolare del concetto di credenza. Da oltre trent’anni gli psicologi utilizzano il test della falsa credenza per valutare la capacità dei bambini di attribuire stati mentali a se stessi e a agli altri. Tuttavia non è stato ancora pienamente compreso né quali requisiti cognitivi siano necessari per passare il test né quale sia il loro sviluppo. In questo articolo (...)
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  28. added 2015-07-06
    The Semantic Problem(s) with Research on Animal Mind‐Reading.Cameron Buckner - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):566-589.
    Philosophers and cognitive scientists have worried that research on animal mind-reading faces a ‘logical problem’: the difficulty of experimentally determining whether animals represent mental states (e.g. seeing) or merely the observable evidence (e.g. line-of-gaze) for those mental states. The most impressive attempt to confront this problem has been mounted recently by Robert Lurz. However, Lurz' approach faces its own logical problem, revealing this challenge to be a special case of the more general problem of distal content. Moreover, participants in this (...)
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  29. added 2015-07-06
    Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2007 - In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. pp. 191--209.
    When we ask the question whether animals have their own folk psychology, we’re asking whether any other species has a commonsense conception of psychological phenomenon. Different versions of this question have been discussed over the past 25 years, but no clear answer has emerged. Perhaps one reason for this lack of progress is that we don’t clearly understand the question. I defend a two-fold view of folk psychology that takes as central the capacity to engage in some folk psychological practices (...)
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  30. added 2015-05-05
    Direct Social Perception and Dual Process Theories of Mindreading.Mitchell Herschbach - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:483-497.
    The direct social perception thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 mindreading (...)
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  31. added 2015-04-18
    Autism Spectrum and Cheaters Detection.Miguel López Astorga - 2014 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 7 (1):1-10.
    Rutherford and Ray think that human beings have mental mechanisms that help them to detect individuals that, deliberately, do not follow a rule. In the same way, they hold that autism is not a disorder in which these mechanisms are damaged. This idea seems contrary to the thesis, supported by some researchers, that autistic people have a theory of mind deficit. This is because of, if Rutherford and Ray are right, autistic people can detect other people's intentions. In this paper, (...)
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  32. added 2015-03-09
    The Belief Illusion.J. Christopher Jenson - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):965-995.
    I offer a new argument for the elimination of ‘beliefs’ from cognitive science based on Wimsatt’s concept of robustness and a related concept of fragility. Theoretical entities are robust if multiple independent means of measurement produce invariant results in detecting them. Theoretical entities are fragile when multiple independent means of detecting them produce highly variant results. I argue that sufficiently fragile theoretical entities do not exist. Recent studies in psychology show radical variance between what self-report and non-verbal behaviour indicate about (...)
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  33. added 2015-02-27
    Simulation Theory.Shannon Spaulding - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Handbook of Imagination. Routledge Press. pp. 262-273.
    This is a penultimate draft of a paper that will appear in Handbook of Imagination, Amy Kind (ed.). Routledge Press. Please cite only the final printed version.
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  34. added 2015-02-08
    Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind's Privacy.William Hirstein - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    [This download contains the Table of Contents and Chapter 1]. I argue here that the claim that conscious states are private, in the sense that only one person can ever experience them directly, is false. There actually is a way to connect the brains of two people that would allow one to have direct experience of the other's conscious, e.g., perceptual states. This would allow, for instance, one person to see that the other had deviant color perception (which was masked (...)
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  35. added 2015-01-13
    On Direct Social Perception.Shannon Spaulding - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482.
    Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive others’ mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the debate at an impasse. I suggest two alternative interpretations of the idea that we see others’ mental states: others’ mental states are represented in the content of our perception, and we have basic perceptual beliefs about others’ mental states. I argue that the latter interpretation of DSP is more promising and examine (...)
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  36. added 2014-10-25
    Phenomenology of Social Cognition.Spaulding Shannon - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):1069-1089.
    Can phenomenological evidence play a decisive role in accepting or rejecting social cognition theories? Is it the case that a theory of social cognition ought to explain and be empirically supported by our phenomenological experience? There is serious disagreement about the answers to these questions. This paper aims to determine the methodological role of phenomenology in social cognition debates. The following three features are characteristic of evidence capable of playing a substantial methodological role: novelty, reliability, and relevance. I argue that (...)
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  37. added 2014-07-31
    Why Desire Reasoning is Developmentally Prior to Belief Reasoning.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & John Michael - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):526-549.
    The predominant view in developmental psychology is that young children are able to reason with the concept of desire prior to being able to reason with the concept of belief. We propose an explanation of this phenomenon that focuses on the cognitive tasks that competence with the belief and desire concepts enable young children to perform. We show that cognitive tasks that are typically considered fundamental to our competence with the belief and desire concepts can be performed with the concept (...)
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  38. added 2014-04-27
    Epicurean Aspects of Mental State Attributions.Anil Gomes & Matthew Parrott - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1001-1011.
    In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman, and Wegner present three experiments which they take to show that people judge patients in a persistent vegetative state to have less mental capacity than the dead. They explain this result by claiming that people have implicit dualist or afterlife beliefs. This essay critically evaluates their experimental findings and their proposed explanation. We argue first that the experiments do not support the conclusion that people intuitively think PVS patients have less mentality than the dead. (...)
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  39. added 2014-03-30
    The Primate Mindreading Controversy : A Case Study in Simplicity and Methodology in Animal Psychology.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2009 - In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. pp. 224--246.
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  40. added 2014-03-05
    True Belief Belies False Belief: Recent Findings of Competence in Infants and Limitations in 5-Year-Olds, and Implications for Theory of Mind Development.Joseph A. Hedger & William V. Fabricius - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):429-447.
    False belief tasks have enjoyed a monopoly in the research on children?s development of a theory of mind. They have been granted this status because they promise to deliver an unambiguous assessment of children?s understanding of the representational nature of mental states. Their poor cousins, true belief tasks, have been relegated to occasional service as control tasks. That this is their only role has been due to the universal assumption that correct answers on true belief tasks are inherently ambiguous regarding (...)
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  41. added 2014-02-22
    Povinelli’s Problem and Introspection.Michael Roche - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):559-576.
    Povinelli’s Problem is a well-known methodological problem confronting those researching nonhuman primate cognition. In this paper I add a new wrinkle to this problem. The wrinkle concerns introspection, i.e., the ability to detect one’s own mental states. I argue that introspection either creates a new obstacle to solving Povinelli’s Problem, or creates a slightly different, but closely related, problem. I apply these arguments to Robert Lurz and Carla Krachun’s (Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2: 449–481, 2011) recent attempt at solving (...)
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  42. added 2013-07-14
    After All, It’s Still Replication: A Reply to Jacob on Simulation and Mirror Neurons.Luca Barlassina - 2011 - Res Cogitans 8 (1):92-111.
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the simulation theory (ST), mindreading is based on the ability the mind has of replicating others' mental states and processes. Mirror neurons (MNs) are a class of neurons that fire both when an agent performs a goal-directed action and when she observes the same type of action performed by another individual. Since MNs appear to form a replicative mechanism in which a portion of the observer's brain replicates (...)
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  43. added 2012-08-24
    Embodied Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2011 - Philosophical Topics 39 (1):141-162.
    In this paper I evaluate embodied social cognition, embodied cognition’s account of how we understand others. I identify and evaluate three claims that motivate embodied social cognition. These claims are not specific to social cognition; they are general hypotheses about cognition. As such, they may be used in more general arguments for embodied cognition. I argue that we have good reasons to reject these claims. Thus, the case for embodied social cognition fails. Moreover, to the extent that general arguments for (...)
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  44. added 2012-05-22
    Mental State Attributions and the Side-Effect Effect.Chandra Sripada - 2012 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (1):232-238.
    The side-effect effect, in which an agent who does not speci␣cally intend an outcome is seen as having brought it about intentionally, is thought to show that moral factors inappropriately bias judgments of intentionality, and to challenge standard mental state models of intentionality judgments. This study used matched vignettes to dissociate a number of moral factors and mental states. Results support the view that mental states, and not moral factors, explain the side-effect effect. However, the critical mental states appear not (...)
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  45. added 2012-04-10
    Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (2):233-257.
    Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this paper is to clearly explicate the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding? I argue that philosophical and (...)
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  46. added 2011-07-29
    Representing Personality Traits as Conditionals.Richard Evans - 2011 - Aisb 4 (1):35-42.
    This paper compares two approaches to representing personality traits in synthetic agents. It proposes a set of goals that any computational implementation of personality should satisfy. It describes the personality trait system used in The Sims 3. Then an alternative system is described, in which traits are represented as conditionals relating world state to emotional state. It is shown that the conditionals model does a better job of satisfying the desiderata.
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  47. added 2008-12-31
    Theory of Mind and the Ontology of Belief.Simone Gozzano - 1997 - Il Cannocchiale 2 (May-August):145-156.
    In this paper I discuss the problem of animals' beliefs and the ontology associated with the idea of having non propositional content. It is argue that the beliefs of mute animals mainly serve an explanatory purpose.
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