Abstract

A sound historiographical account of the role of logic in the development of medieval philosophical and theological reflection requires a thorough examination of its historical roots and its theoretical implications. An apparent historiographical bias, due to the idea that only the development of contemporary formal logic enables a proper reconstruction of the whole history of logic, can be exposed by taking into account the case of the medieval discussions on the topics, starting from their late-antiquity legacy. An attentive inspection of the successive stages of the gradual formalisation process of medieval topical logic brings to the fore significant theoretical aspects in the philosophy of logic, all too often left aside in common contemporary discussions. In particular, the distinction between topical maxims and topical differences, or principles according to and principles from which an inference is drawn, highlights the specific nature of a major part of medieval logic, that deals with meta-logical issues by means of higher-order logical resources. It is precisely this special character of medieval logic that proves to be of the highest significance in the discussion of the most subtle theological—and just as well philosophical—questions that engaged medieval authors, thus testifying to the essential role of logic in the overall development of medieval thought.