The epistemic significance of experience

Philosophical Studies 173:947-67 (2016)
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Abstract
According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended
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Archival date: 2018-11-07
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Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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Unconscious Perceptual Justification.Berger, Jacob; Nanay, Bence & Quilty-Dunn, Jake

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2015-08-25

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