Self‐Motion and Cognition: Plato's Theory of the Soul

Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (4):523-544 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


I argue that Plato believes that the soul must be both the principle of motion and the subject of cognition because it moves things specifically by means of its thoughts. I begin by arguing that the soul moves things by means of such acts as examination and deliberation, and that this view is developed in response to Anaxagoras. I then argue that every kind of soul enjoys a kind of cognition, with even plant souls having a form of Aristotelian discrimination (krisis), and that there is therefore no completely unintelligent, evil soul in the cosmos that can explain disorderly motions; as a result, the soul is not the principle of all motion but only motion in the cosmos after it has been ordered by the Demiurge.

Author's Profile

Douglas R. Campbell
University of Toronto, St. George Campus


Added to PP

152 (#48,344)

6 months
119 (#6,170)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?