A Ética da Crença: uma Defesa Moderada da Posição Indiciária

Sofia 7 (1):17-40 (2018)
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In this paper, I articulate and discuss Clifford's two main arguments in favor of the norm that it is illegitimate to believe based on insufficient evidence. The first argument appeals to the instrumental value of belief, and the second one appeals to our intrinsic interest in the truth. Both arguments bring to the fore the relevance of moral and social factors to determine norms for belief. I sustain that the first argument is insufficient to establish Clifford's norm in general. Beliefs that are not a mean to an action fall outside the scope of the first argument. The second argument has a wider scope. However, it can be undermined if the agent follows an intellectualized norm that aims to protect the rest of her cognitive and active life from her unjustified beliefs. It’s an empirical matter whether a human agent is able to follow this norm. I defend that Clifford’s norm should be reformulated, including some parameters that have influence on the sufficiency of evidence. Finally, prudential and moral factors can affect the legitimacy of belief. It’s legitimate to believe without sufficient evidence only in special cases, when the agent insulates the unjustified belief, or when the good that results from believing surpasses the harms yielded by credulity.
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First archival date: 2018-02-03
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