Assertion, Uniqueness and Epistemic Hypocrisy

Synthese 194 (5) (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Pascal Engel (2008) has insisted that a number of notable strategies for rejecting the knowledge norm of assertion are put forward on the basis of the wrong kinds of reasons. A central aim of this paper will be to establish the contrast point: I argue that one very familiar strategy for defending the knowledge norm of assertion—viz., that it is claimed to do better in various respects than its competitors (e.g. the justification and the truth norms)— relies on a presupposition that is shown to be ultimately under motivated. That presupposition is the uniqueness thesis—that there is a unique epistemic rule for assertion, and that such a rule will govern assertions uniformly. In particular, the strategy I shall take here will be to challenge the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm in a way that at the same time counts against Williamson’s (2000) own rationale for the uniqueness thesis. However, rather than to challenge the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm via the familiar style of ‘expert opinion’ and, more generally, ‘second-hand knowledge’ cases (e.g. Lackey (2008)), a strategy that has recently been called into question by Benton (2014), I’ll instead advance a very different line of argument against the sufficiency thesis, one which turns on a phenomenon I call epistemic hypocrisy.
Reprint years
2017
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CARAUA-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-05-06
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and Action.Hawthorne, John & Stanley, Jason

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Publishing Without Belief.Plakias, Alexandra

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-05-06

Total views
242 ( #13,354 of 41,550 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
66 ( #8,386 of 41,550 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.