DLEAC and the Rejection Paradox

Journal of Applied Logics 8 (2):377-396 (2021)
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In this paper we first develop a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions, DLEAC. We adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox (LP) extended with a notion of model suitable for DLEAC, and we modify its proof theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion, which are understood as speech acts. We introduce a new paradox – the rejectability paradox – first informally, then formally. We then provide its derivation in an extension of DLEAC contanining the rejectability predicate.

Author Profiles

Massimiliano Carrara
University of Padua
Andrea Strollo
Università degli Studi di Trieste


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