DLEAC and the Rejection Paradox

Journal of Applied Logics 8 (2):377-396 (2021)
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In this paper we first develop a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions, DLEAC. We adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox (LP) extended with a notion of model suitable for DLEAC, and we modify its proof theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion, which are understood as speech acts. We introduce a new paradox – the rejectability paradox – first informally, then formally. We then provide its derivation in an extension of DLEAC contanining the rejectability predicate.
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Archival date: 2021-02-28
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