Results for 'dialetheism'

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  1. Is Dialetheism an Idealism? The Russellian Fallacy and the Dialetheist’s Dilemma.Francesco Berto - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (2):235–263.
    In his famous work on vagueness, Russell named “fallacy of verbalism” the fallacy that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things. In this paper, I examine two (clusters of) mainstream paraconsistent logical theories – the non-adjunctive and relevant approaches –, and show that, if they are given a strongly paraconsistent or dialetheic reading, the charge of committing the Russellian Fallacy can be raised against them in a sophisticated way, by appealing to the intuitive reading of (...)
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  2. Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):193-207.
    Is there a notion of contradiction—let us call it, for dramatic effect, “absolute”—making all contradictions, so understood, unacceptable also for dialetheists? It is argued in this paper that there is, and that spelling it out brings some theoretical benefits. First it gives us a foothold on undisputed ground in the methodologically difficult debate on dialetheism. Second, we can use it to express, without begging questions, the disagreement between dialetheists and their rivals on the nature of truth. Third, dialetheism (...)
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  3. Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox.John N. Williams - 2013 - Theoria 81 (1):27-47.
    John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart of (...)
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  4. Metametametaphysics and Dialetheism.Suki Finn - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1):128-146.
    This paper reflects on metametaphysics and as such develops a metametameta-physical view: that quietist metametaphysics requires dialetheism, and in turn a paraconsistent logic. I demonstrate this using Carnap’s metametaphysical position in his 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' as an example, with regard to how it exhibits self-reference and results in inconsistency. I show how applying Carnap’s position to itself produces a dilemma, both horns of which lead to a contradiction. Such inconsistency commonly arises from meta-theories with global scope, as the (...)
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  5. Graham Priest's «Dialetheism» -- Is It Althogether True?Lorenzo Peña - 1996 - Sorites 7:28-56.
    Graham Priest's book In Contradiction is a bold defense of the existence of true contradictions. Although Priest's case is impressive, and many of his arguments are correct, his approach is not the only one allowing for true contradictions. As against Priest's, there is at least one contradictorialist approach which establishes a link between true contradictions and degrees of truth. All in all, such an alternative is more conservative, closer to mainstream analytical philosophy. The two approaches differ as regards the floodgate (...)
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  6. Άδύνατον and Material Exclusion 1.Francesco Berto - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):165 – 190.
    Philosophical dialetheism, whose main exponent is Graham Priest, claims that some contradictions hold, are true, and it is rational to accept and assert them. Such a position is naturally portrayed as a challenge to the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). But all the classic formulations of the LNC are, in a sense, not questioned by a typical dialetheist, since she is (cheerfully) required to accept them by her own theory. The goal of this paper is to develop a formulation of (...)
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  7.  24
    What is a Contradiction?Patrick Grim - 2004 - In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--72.
    The Law of Non-Contradiction holds that both sides of a contradiction cannot be true. Dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions both sides of which are true. Crucial to the dispute, then, is the central notion of contradiction. My first step here is to work toward clarification of that simple and central notion: Just what is a contradiction?
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  8. Embedding Denial.David Ripley - 2015 - In Colin Caret & Ole Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford University Press. pp. 289-309.
    Suppose Alice asserts p, and the Caterpillar wants to disagree. If the Caterpillar accepts classical logic, he has an easy way to indicate this disagreement: he can simply assert ¬p. Sometimes, though, things are not so easy. For example, suppose the Cheshire Cat is a paracompletist who thinks that p ∨ ¬p fails (in familiar (if possibly misleading) language, the Cheshire Cat thinks p is a gap). Then he surely disagrees with Alice's assertion of p, but should himself be unwilling (...)
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  9.  29
    On Falsifying Empirical Contradictions.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    The possibility of testing contradictory statements about the factual world has been suggested but barely discussed in the relevant literature. Here I argue that if we assume that there are contradictory observation sentences, it would be logically impossible to falsify them. Accordingly, the extension of the dialetheist programme into empirical science would be non-advisable, for it would introduce logically unfalsifiable claims.
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  10. Towards a Philosophical Understanding of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency.Walter Carnielli & Abílio Rodrigues - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (2):155-184.
    In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non-contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order to philosophically justify (...)
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  11. Science Generates Limit Paradoxes.Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (4):409-432.
    The sciences occasionally generate discoveries that undermine their own assumptions. Two such discoveries are characterized here: the discovery of apophenia by cognitive psychology and the discovery that physical systems cannot be locally bounded within quantum theory. It is shown that such discoveries have a common structure and that this common structure is an instance of Priest’s well-known Inclosure Schema. This demonstrates that science itself is dialetheic: it generates limit paradoxes. How science proceeds despite this fact is briefly discussed, as is (...)
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  12. The Law of Non-Contradiction as a Metaphysical Principle.Tuomas Tahko - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Logic 7:32-47.
    The goals of this paper are two-fold: I wish to clarify the Aristotelian conception of the law of non-contradiction as a metaphysical rather than a semantic or logical principle, and to defend the truth of the principle in this sense. First I will explain what it in fact means that the law of non-contradiction is a metaphysical principle. The core idea is that the law of non-contradiction is a general principle derived from how things are in the world. For example, (...)
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  13. The Theory of Aḥwāl and Arguments Against the Law of Non-Contradiction.Behnam Zolghadr - 2020 - In Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies. Berlin, Germany: pp. 31-52.
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  14. Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications.Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.) - 2013 - Springer.
    A logic is called 'paraconsistent' if it rejects the rule called 'ex contradictione quodlibet', according to which any conclusion follows from inconsistent premises. While logicians have proposed many technically developed paraconsistent logical systems and contemporary philosophers like Graham Priest have advanced the view that some contradictions can be true, and advocated a paraconsistent logic to deal with them, until recent times these systems have been little understood by philosophers. This book presents a comprehensive overview on paraconsistent logical systems to change (...)
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  15. The Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Truth.Tuomas Tahko - 2014 - In Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things In Between. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 233-248.
    The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth appears to be, truth in a model, that is relative truth, is evaluated in terms of the relation between sentences and models. (...)
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  16.  19
    Paradox is Here to Stay. [REVIEW]Blaine Snow - manuscript
    Review of Graham Priest's "Beyond the Limits of Thought.".
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  17.  78
    A Paradox of Rejection.Thomas N. P. A. Brouwer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4451-4464.
    Given any proposition, is it possible to have rationally acceptable attitudes towards it? Absent reasons to the contrary, one would probably think that this should be possible. In this paper I provide a reason to the contrary. There is a proposition such that, if one has any opinions about it at all, one will have a rationally unacceptable set of propositional attitudes—or if one doesn’t, one will end up being cognitively imperfect in some other manner. The proposition I am concerned (...)
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  18. On the Logic of Values.Manuel Dries - 2010 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 39 (1):30-50.
    This article argues that Nietzsche's transvaluation project refers not to a mere inversion or negation of a set of values but, instead, to a different conception of what a value is and how it functions. Traditional values function within a standard logical framework and claim legitimacy and bindingness based on exogenous authority with absolute extension. Nietzsche regards this framework as unnecessarily reductive in its attempted exclusion of contradiction and real opposition among competing values and proposes a nonstandard, dialetheic model of (...)
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  19.  21
    DLEAC and the Rejection Paradox.Massimiliano Carrara & Andrea Strollo - 2021 - Journal of Applied Logics 8 (2):377-396.
    In this paper we first develop a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions, DLEAC. We adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox (LP) extended with a notion of model suitable for DLEAC, and we modify its proof theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion, which are understood as speech acts. We introduce a new paradox – the rejectability paradox – first informally, then formally. We then provide its derivation in an extension of DLEAC contanining the rejectability (...)
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  20.  31
    Über Poppers Forderung nach Widerspruchlosigkeit.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - 2019 - Felsefe Arkivi 51:31-36.
    Popper restricted his definition of falsifiability to consistent theories through what we may call his requirement of consistency. His main argument was that an inconsistent theory does not distinguish the sentences that corroborate it from those that contradict it, for all sentences follow from it. I propose to replace this requirement by the more basic requirement that the classes of potential corroborators and falsifiers of a theory do not overlap. This results not only in an unrestricted definition of falsifiability but (...)
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  21.  63
    A Quantificational Analysis of the Liar Paradox.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It seems that the most common strategy to solve the liar paradox is to argue that liar sentences are meaningless and, consequently, truth-valueless. The other main option that has grown in recent years is the dialetheist view that treats liar sentences as meaningful, truth-apt and true. In this paper I will offer a new approach that does not belong in either camp. I hope to show that liar sentences can be interpreted as meaningful, truth-apt and false, but without engendering any (...)
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  22.  78
    On False Antecedent in Dialetheic Entailment.Massimiliano Carrara - 2019 - In Luca Bellotti, Luca Gili, Enrico Moriconi & Giacomo Turbanti (eds.), Third Pisa Colloquium in Logic, Language and Epistemology. Pisa PI, Italia: Edizioni ETS. pp. 59-68.
    Aim of the paper is to analyze Priest’s dialetheic solution to Curry’s paradox. It has been shown that a solution refuting ABS, accepting MPP and consequently refuting CP meets some difficulties. Here I just concentrate on one difficulty: one obtains the validity of MPP just using FA in the metalanguage, an invalid rule for a dialetheist.
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  23. On Philosophical Motivations for Paraconsistency: An Ontology-Free Interpretation of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency.Walter Carnielli & Abilio Rodrigues - manuscript
    In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non- contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order to philosophically (...)
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  24. Swyneshed, Paradox and the Rule of Contradictory Pairs.Stephen Read - manuscript
    Roger Swyneshed, in his treatise on insolubles (logical paradoxes), dating from the early 1330s, drew three notorious corollaries of his solution. The third states that there is a contradictory pair of propositions both of which are false. This appears to contradict the Rule of Contradictory Pairs, which requires that in every such pair, one must be true and the other false. Looking back at Aristotle's treatise De Interpretatione, we find that Aristotle himself, immediately after defining the notion of a contradictory (...)
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  25.  15
    Can We Test Inconsistent Empirical Theories?Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    This paper discusses the logical possibility of testing an inconsistent empirical theory. The main challenge for answering this affirmatively is to avoiding that the inconsistent consequences of a theory are both potential corroborators and falsifiers of the same theory. I answer affirmatively by showing that we can define a class of empirical sentences whose truth would force us to abandon such inconsistent theory: the class of its potential refuters. In spite of this, I show that the contradictions implied by a (...)
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  26.  78
    La contrastación de teorías inconsistentes no triviales.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - 2020 - Dissertation, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos
    This dissertation offers a proof of the logical possibility of testing empirical/factual theories that are inconsistent, but non-trivial. In particular, I discuss whether or not such theories can satisfy Popper's principle of falsifiablility. An inconsistent theory Ƭ closed under a classical consequence relation implies every statement of its language because in classical logic the inconsistency and triviality are coextensive. A theory Ƭ is consistent iff there is not a α such that Ƭ ⊢ α ∧ ¬α, otherwise it is inconsistent. (...)
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  27. On Modal Meinongianism.Thibaut Giraud - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).
    Modal Meinongianism is a form of Meinongianism whose main supporters are Graham Priest and Francesco Berto. The main idea of modal Meinongianism is to restrict the logical deviance of Meinongian non-existent objects to impossible worlds and thus prevent it from “contaminating” the actual world: the round square is round and not round, but not in the actual world, only in an impossible world. In the actual world, supposedly, no contradiction is true. I will show that Priest’s semantics, as originally formulated (...)
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  28. The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate.Eric Dietrich & Julietta Rose - 2009 - Logos Architekton 3 (1):7-37.
    Beginning with the paradoxes of zombie twins, we present an argument that dualism is both true and false. We show that avoiding this contradiction is impossible. Our diagnosis is that consciousness itself engenders this contradiction by producing contradictory points of view. This result has a large effect on the realism/anti-realism debate, namely, it suggests that this debate is intractable, and furthermore, it explains why this debate is intractable. We close with some comments on what our results mean for metaphysics and (...)
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  29.  98
    Efimov K-Theory of Diamonds.Shanna Dobson - manuscript
    Motivated by Scholze and Fargues' geometrization of the local Langlands correspondence using perfectoid diamonds and Clausen and Scholze's work on the K-theory of adic spaces using condensed mathematics, we introduce the Efimov K-theory of diamonds. We propose a large stable (infinity,1)-category of diamonds D^{diamond}, a diamond spectra and chromatic tower, and a localization sequence for diamond spectra. Commensurate with the localization sequence, we detail three potential applications of the Efimov K-theory of D^{diamond}: to emergent time as a pro-emergence (v-stack time) (...)
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  30.  86
    Social Inconsistency.Thomas Brouwer - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Though the social world is real and objective, the way that social facts arise out of other facts is in an important way shaped by human thought, talk and behaviour. Building on recent work in social ontology, I describe a mechanism whereby this distinctive malleability of social facts, combined with the possibility of basic human error, makes it possible for a consistent physical reality to ground an inconsistent social reality. I explore various ways of resisting the prima facie case for (...)
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  31. A Survey of Logical Realism.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2019 - Synthese.
    Logical realism is a view about the metaphysical status of logic. Common to most if not all the views captured by the label ‘logical realism’ is that logical facts are mind- and language-independent. But that does not tell us anything about the nature of logical facts or about our epistemic access to them. The goal of this paper is to outline and systematize the different ways that logical realism could be entertained and to examine some of the challenges that these (...)
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