Epistemic and Deontic Should

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Probabilistic theories of “should” and “ought” face a predicament. At first blush, it seems that such theories must provide different lexical entries for the epistemic and the deontic interpretations of these modals. I show that there is a new style of premise semantics that can avoid this consequence in an attractively conservative way.
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Archival date: 2016-04-29
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Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Epistemic Modals.Yalcin, Seth
Ifs and Oughts.Kolodny, Niko & MacFarlane, John
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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Assertion and Modality.Cariani, Fabrizio

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