Knowledge, Assertion and Intellectual Humility

Logos and Episteme 7 (4):489-502 (2016)
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Abstract
This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility in social-epistemic practice.
ISBN(s)
2069-0533  
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CARKAA-6
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Archival date: 2017-01-08
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Norms of Assertion.Lackey, Jennifer
Knowing and Asserting.Williamson, Timothy

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