The Coherence of Empiricism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):31-48 (2002)
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Rationalists often argue that empiricism is incoherent and conclude, on that basis, that some knowledge is a priori. I contend that such arguments against empiricism cannot be parlayed into an argument in support of the a priori since rationalism is open to the same arguments. I go on to offer an alternative strategy. The leading idea is that, instead of offering a priori arguments against empiricism, rationalists should marshal empirical support for their position.

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Albert Casullo
University of Nebraska, Lincoln


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