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  1. Intuition and Modal Error.George Bealer - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Modal intuitions are not only the primary source of modal knowledge but also the primary source of modal error. An explanation of how modal error arises — and, in particular, how erroneous modal intuitions arise — is an essential part of a comprehensive theory of knowledge and evidence. This chapter begins with a summary of certain preliminaries: the phenomenology of intuitions, their fallibility, the nature of concept-understanding and its relationship to the reliability of intuitions, and so forth. It then identifies (...)
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  2. "In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification" by Laurence BonJour. [REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):502-6.
    Laurence BonJour divides approaches to a priori justification into three kinds. Quine’s radical empiricism denies the existence of any special category of a priori justification; moderate empiricism attempts to explain a priori justification in terms of something like knowledge of meaning or grasp of concepts; and rationalism postulates an irreducible ‘rational insight’ into the nature of reality. The positions therefore form a familiar trio of eliminativism, reductionism and anti-reductionism concerning a priori justification. BonJour’s interesting and (in the present philosophical climate) (...)
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  3. The Limits of Aesthetic Empiricism.Fabian Dorsch - 2014 - In Gregory Currie, Matthew Kieran, Aaron Meskin & Jon Robson (eds.), Aesthetics and the Sciences of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-100.
    In this chapter, I argue against empiricist positions which claim that empirical evidence can be sufficient to defeasibly justify aesthetic judgements, or judgements about the adequacy of aesthetic judgements, or sceptical judgements about someone's capacity to form adequate aesthetic judgements. First, empirical evidence provides neither inferential, nor non-inferential justification for aesthetic opinions. Second, while empirical evidence may tell us how we do respond aesthetically to artworks, it cannot tell us how we should respond to them. And, third, empirical insights into (...)
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  4. The Realm of Reason. [REVIEW]Julian Fink - 2005 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 8.
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  5. Aristotle's Rationalism.Michael Frede - 1996 - In Michael Frede & Gisela Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought. Oxford University Press. pp. 157--173.
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  6. Two Kinds of a Priori Infallibility.Glen Hoffmann - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):241-253.
    On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified (or absolutely warranted), i.e., justified to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity. Though rationalist infallibilism is indisputably running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justification refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some category (i) propositions, while Burge (...)
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  7. Aproximaciones a la epistemología francesa.Pedro Karczmarczyk, Gassmann Carlos, Acosta Jazmín Anahí, Rivera Silvia, Cuervo Sola Manuel, Torrano Andrea & Abeijón Matías - 2013 - In Karczmarczyk Pedro (ed.), Estudios de Epistemología. Instituto de epistemología, Universidad Nacional de Tucumán. pp. 1-164.
    Aproximaciones a la escuela francesa de epistemología Los problemas que dominan a la epistemología pueden contextualizarse históricamente como una forma de racionalidad filosófica. La filosofía se ha presentado a lo largo de la historia como un discurso en el que sus diversos componentes (metafísica, ontología, gnoseología, ética, lógica, etc.) se mostraron unidos en el molde de la ?unidad del saber?. En este marco unitario alguna de las formas del saber filosófico detenta usualmente una posición dominante. El énfasis colocado en la (...)
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  8. Analytic Philosophy.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2009 - Kendall Hunt Pub. Co.
    Philosophy is the science of the science; it is the analysis of the assumptions underlying empirical inquiry. Given that these assumptions cannot possibly be examined or even identified on the basis of empirical data, it follows that philosophy is a non-empirical discipline. And given that our linguistic and cultural practices cannot possibly be examined or even identified except on the basis of empirical data, it follows that philosophical questions are not linguistic questions and do not otherwise concern our conventions or (...)
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  9. Roger Trigg, Philosophy Matters (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). [REVIEW]Michael Lacewing - 2003 - Think 1 (3):107-111.
    The fundamental premise of Trigg's book is that philosophy is an irreplaceable discipline, and Trigg seeks to defend it from the Scylla of scientism and the Charibdis of relativism. His bold tone will engage many readers in the challenges he discusses.
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  10. Peacocke’s A Priori Arguments Against Scepticism.B. J. C. Madison - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):1-8.
    In The Realm of Reason (2004), Christopher Peacocke develops a “generalized rationalism” concerning, among other things, what it is for someone to be “entitled”, or justified, in forming a given belief. In the course of his discussion, Peacocke offers two arguments to the best explanation that aim to undermine scepticism and establish a justification for our belief in the reliability of sense perception, respectively. If sound, these ambitious arguments would answer some of the oldest and most vexing epistemological problems. In (...)
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  11. Bursting Bealer's Bubble: How the Starting Points Argument Begs the Question of Foundationalism Against Quine.Michael J. Shaffer & Jason A. Warnick - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):87-106.
    In his 1993 article George Bealer offers three separate arguments that are directed against the internal coherence of empiricism, specifically against Quine’s version of empiricism. One of these arguments is the starting points argument (SPA) and it is supposed to show that Quinean empiricism is incoherent. We argue here that this argument is deeply flawed, and we demonstrate how a Quinean may successfully defend his views against Bealer’s SPA. Our defense of Quinean empiricism against the SPA depends on showing (1) (...)
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  12. Reconstruction and Pragmatist Metaphysics. On Brandom’s Understanding of Rationality.Italo Testa - 2012 - Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 41 (1-3):175-201.
    In this paper I illustrate what is reconstructive rationality, a notion that remains rather undetermined in Robert Brandom's work. I argue that theoretical and historical thinking are instances of reconstruction and should not be identified with it. I then explore a further instance of rational reconstruction, which Brandom calls “reconstructive metaphysics”, arguing that the demarcation between metaphysical and non-metaphysical theories has to be understood as a pragmatic one. Finally, I argue that Brandom’s reconstructive metaphysics is basically a pragmatist metaphysics. Here (...)
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Rationalism, Misc
  1. Descartes's Method of Doubt.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Enlightenment philosopher, René Descartes, set out to establish what could be known with certainty, untainted by a deceiving demon. With his method of doubt, he rejected all previous beliefs, allowing only those that survived rigorous scrutiny. In this essay, Leslie Allan examines whether Descartes's program of skeptical enquiry was successful in laying a firm foundation for our manifold beliefs. He subjects Descartes's conclusions to Descartes's own uncompromising methodology to determine whether Descartes escaped from a self-imposed radical skepticism.
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  2. One Dogma of Millianism.Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):70-92.
    Millians about proper names typically claim that it is knowable apriori that Hesperus is Phosphorus. We argue that they should claim instead that it is knowable only aposteriori that Hesperus is Hesperus, since the Kripke-Putnam epistemic arguments against descriptivism are special cases of Quinean arguments that nothing is knowable apriori, and Millians have no resources to resist the more general Quinean arguments.
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  3. Intuitive Knowledge.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
    In this paper I assume that we have some intuitive knowledge—i.e. beliefs that amount to knowledge because they are based on intuitions. The question I take up is this: given that some intuition makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? We can ask a similar question about perception. That is: given that some perception makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? (...)
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  4. A Problem for Rationalist Responses to Skepticism.Sinan Dogramaci - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):355-369.
    Rationalism, my target, says that in order to have perceptual knowledge, such as that your hand is making a fist, you must “antecedently” (or “independently”) know that skeptical scenarios don’t obtain, such as the skeptical scenario that you are in the Matrix. I motivate the specific form of Rationalism shared by, among others, White (Philos Stud 131:525–557, 2006) and Wright (Proc Aristot Soc Suppl Vol 78:167–212, 2004), which credits us with warrant to believe (or “accept”, in Wright’s terms) that our (...)
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  5. Apriority.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - In Gillian Russell Delia Graff Fara (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    After briefly expositing some fundamental issues in current debates about apriority, I go on to critically examine meaning-based explanations of how we acquire apriori justification.
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  6. An Epistemological Turn in Contemporary Islamic Reform Discourse.Shadi Heydar - 2015 - Confluence 3 (1):215-239.
    Abdolkarim Soroush’s thought is regarded by some researchers as a turning point in contemporary Islamic reform discourse. This article concerns Soroush’s epistemology as a determining factor in this paradigm shift and interprets this shift as an epistemological turn in Islamic reform discourse, shifting from ›Islamic genealogy of modernity‹ to rationalization of Islamic methodology. After a short introduction to Soroush’s intellectual biography, this article will isolate neorationalism or neo-Mu’tazilism, religious post-positivism, historicism, hermeneutics, and dialogism as main features of Soroush’s epistemology. This (...)
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  7. There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning.Michael Huemer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):592-613.
    The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite regress. Nor does subjective Bayesianism offer a way out for the empiricist. Despite often-cited convergence theorems, subjective (...)
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  8. Sueños de un racionalista. Sobre la diatriba de Kant contra Swedenborg o por una ontología simbólica.Máximo Lameiro - 2008 - A Parte Rei 58:4.
    On 18th century Kant found the Swedenborg's writings, and then wrote an aggressive refutation titled "The dream of a visionary". But Kant did not understand the Swedenborg experience and theories really. Because his rationalism he was unable to do that. This paper analyse the Kant's argumentation and shows its weak points and his inadequacy.
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  9. Philosophical Roast or (What I Think).Psychotic Logician - manuscript
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  10. How Universities Can Help Create a Wiser World.Nicholas Maxwell - 2014 - Times Higher Education , No. 21 P. 30 (2136):30.
    The crisis of our times is that we have science without wisdom. Modern science and technology lead to modern industry and agriculture which in turn lead to all the great benefits of the modern world and to the global crises we face, from population growth to climate change. The fault lies, not with science, but with science dissociated from a more fundamental concern with problems of living. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in academia so that the fundamental (...)
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  11. A Priori Conjectural Knowledge in Physics: The Comprehensibility of the Universe.Nicholas Maxwell - 2005 - In Michael Veber & Michael Shaffer (eds.), What Place for the A Priori? Chicago: Open Court. pp. 211-240.
    In this paper I argue for a priori conjectural scientific knowledge about the world. Physics persistently only accepts unified theories, even though endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals are always available. This persistent preference for unified theories, against empirical considerations, means that physics makes a substantial, persistent metaphysical assumption, to the effect that the universe has a (more or less) unified dynamic structure. In order to clarify what this assumption amounts to, I solve the problem of what it means (...)
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  12. Principios de justificación en la racionalidad informal de Hilary Putnam.Pablo Melogno - 2012 - Tópicos 24 (24):00-00.
    En Razón, Verdad e Historia Hilary Putnam caracterizó la racionalidad informal como una alternativa que permite superar las limitaciones evidenciadas por las concepciones formalistas de la racionalidad. Se revisa inicialmente la caracterización ofrecida por Putnam y se establece que si bien Putnam niega todo principio universal de racionalidad, admite principios relativos, generales e indeterminados, que permanecen sujetos a necesidades de interrelación cognitiva con el entorno. A continuación, se muestra que los principios aceptan excepciones, y, a partir de aquí se defiende (...)
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  13. REVIEW: James R. Brown, Laboratory of the Mind. [REVIEW]Michael T. Stuart - 2012 - Spontaneous Generations 6 (1):237-241.
    Originally published in 1991, The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences, is the first monograph to identify and address some of the many interesting questions that pertain to thought experiments. While the putative aim of the book is to explore the nature of thought experimental evidence, it has another important purpose which concerns the crucial role thought experiments play in Brown’s Platonic master argument.In that argument, Brown argues against naturalism and empiricism (Brown 2012), for mathematical Platonism (...)
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