View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories
Subcategories:History/traditions: Empiricism

32 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
Material to categorize
  1. The Limits of Aesthetic Empiricism.Fabian Dorsch - 2014 - In Gregory Currie, Matthew Kieran, Aaron Meskin & Jon Robson (eds.), Aesthetics and the Sciences of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-100.
    In this chapter, I argue against empiricist positions which claim that empirical evidence can be sufficient to defeasibly justify aesthetic judgements, or judgements about the adequacy of aesthetic judgements, or sceptical judgements about someone's capacity to form adequate aesthetic judgements. First, empirical evidence provides neither inferential, nor non-inferential justification for aesthetic opinions. Second, while empirical evidence may tell us how we do respond aesthetically to artworks, it cannot tell us how we should respond to them. And, third, empirical insights into (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. Die Grenzen des ästhetischen Empirismus.Fabian Dorsch - 2012 - Zeitschrift für Ästhetik Und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 57 (2):269-281.
    In den letzten Jahren ist es recht populär geworden, traditionelle Fragen der philosophischen Ästhetik – wie zum Beispiel die nach der Natur und Rechtfertigung ästhetischer Beurteilungen – mithilfe empirischer Forschungsergebnisse zu beantworten zu versuchen. Diesem empiristisch geprägten Ansatz möchte ich gerne eine rationalistisch orientierte Auffassung der ästhetischen Erfahrung und Bewertung von Kunstwerken entgegensetzen. Insbesondere werde ich die ästhetische Relevanz dreier verschiedener Arten empirischer Studien kritisch diskutieren: (i) solcher, die einzelne Kunstwerke unter Einsatz der Natur- oder Geschichtswissenschaften erforschen; (ii) solcher, die (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. The Aesthetic Relevance of Empirical Findings.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Kongress-Akten der Deutschen Gesellschaft Für Ästhetik 2:1-21.
    Empirical findings may be relevant for aesthetic evaluation in at least two ways. First — within criticism — they may help us to identify the aesthetic value of objects. Second— whithin philosophy — they may help us to decide which theory of aesthetic value and evaluation to prefer. In this paper, I address both kinds of relevance. My focus is thereby on empirical evidence gathered, not by means of first-personal experiences, but by means of third-personal scientific investigations of individual artworks (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Empirismo senza fondamenti - Cinque lezioni su "Empirismo e filosofia della mente".Andrea Guardo - 2007 - CUEM.
    A study guide to Wilfrid Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. 'Science Itself Teaches'. A Fresh Look at Quine's Naturalistic Metaphilosophy.Geert Keil - 2003 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):253-280.
    Quine famously holds that "philosophy is continuous with natural science". In order to find out what exactly the point of this claim is, I take up one of his preferred phrases and trace it through his writings, i.e., the phrase "Science itself teaches that …". Unlike Wittgenstein, Quine did not take much interest in determining what might be distinctive of philosophical investigations, or of the philosophical part of scientific investigations. I find this indifference regrettable, and I take a fresh look (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Empiricism, Objectivity, and Explanation.Elisabeth A. Lloyd & Carl G. Anderson - 1993 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):121-131.
    We sley Salmon, in his influential and detailed book, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, argues that the pragmatic approach to scientific explanation, “construed as the claim that scientific explanation can be explicated entirely in pragmatic terms” (1989, 185) is inadequate. The specific inadequacy ascribed to a pragmatic account is that objective relevance relations cannot be incorporated into such an account. Salmon relies on the arguments given in Kitcher and Salmon (1987) to ground this objection. He also suggests that Peter Railton’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7. Katz's Revisability Paradox Dissolved.Allard Tamminga & Sander Verhaegh - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):771-784.
    Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: *noncontradiction*, *universal revisability* and *pragmatic ordering*. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Constructive Empiricism and the Argument From Underdetermination.Maarten Van Dyck - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press.
    It is argued that, contrary to prevailing opinion, Bas van Fraassen nowhere uses the argument from underdetermination in his argument for constructive empiricism. It is explained that van Fraassen’s use of the notion of empirical equivalence in The Scientific Image has been widely misunderstood. A reconstruction of the main arguments for constructive empiricism is offered, showing how the passages that have been taken to be part of an appeal to the argument from underdetermination should actually be interpreted.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Rethinking Empiricism and Materialism: The Revisionist View.Charles T. Wolfe - 2010 - Annales Philosophici 1 (1):101-113.
    There is an enduring story about empiricism, which runs as follows: from Locke onwards to Carnap, empiricism is the doctrine in which raw sense-data are received through the passive mechanism of perception; experience is the effect produced by external reality on the mind or ‘receptors’. Empiricism on this view is the ‘handmaiden’ of experimental natural science, seeking to redefine philosophy and its methods in conformity with the results of modern science. Secondly, there is a story about materialism, popularized initially by (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
Empiricism, Misc
  1. Meditations on Moral Philosophy.John Altmann - manuscript
    An extensive commentary on moral philosophy that is a renunciation of my previous two essays. This essay promotes the idea that the answer to an objective morality lies in examining moral problems through an epistemic lens.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. A Modest Defense of Manifestationalism.Jamin Asay & S. Seth Bordner - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):147-161.
    As the debate between realists and empiricists in the philosophy of science drags on, one point of consensus has emerged: no one wants to be a manifestationalist. The manifestationalist is a kind of radical empiricist who argues that science provides theories that aim neither at a true picture of the entire world, nor even an empirically adequate picture that captures the world in all its observable respects. For manifestationalists, science aims only at providing theories that are true to the observed (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Oraciones observacionales y empirismo ilustrado en la filosofía de Quine.Ignacio Ávila - 2014 - Ideas Y Valores 63 (154):271-294.
    En este ensayo planteo una dificultad que encuentro en la última propuesta que Quine desarrolló sobre las oraciones observacionales. Argumento que esta dificultad impide que tales oraciones cumplan satisfactoriamente el rol que él les asigna en su filosofía y comprometen seriamente su empirismo ilustrado. Luego trato de explorar tentativamente un resquicio que encuentro en la propia filosofía quineana que eventualmente podría evitar los problemas derivados de dicha dificultad. El precio de seguir el camino apuntado por ese resquicio es, sin embargo, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Observation sentences and enlightened empiricism in Quine's philosophy.Ignacio Ávila - 2014 - Ideas Y Valores 63 (154):271-294.
    En este ensayo planteo una dificultad que encuentro en la última propuesta de Quine sobre las oraciones observacionales. Argumento que esta dificultad impide que tales oraciones cumplan el rol que él les asigna en su filosofía y socavan su empirismo ilustrado. Luego exploro tentativamente un resquicio que encuentro en la propia filosofía quineana que eventualmente podría evitar los problemas derivados de dicha dificultad. El precio de seguir el camino apuntado por ese resquicio es, sin embargo, una cierta reinterpretación del espíritu (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Sympathy for the Devil: Reconsidering Ernst Mach's Empiricism. [REVIEW]Erik C. Banks - 2012 - Metascience 21 (2):321-330.
    A 2012 review article for Metascience which explains Mach's realistic brand of empiricism, contrasting it with the common phenomenalist reading of Mach by John Blackmore in two recent books.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. The Incoherence of Empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.
    Radical empiricism is the view that a person's experiences (sensory and introspective), or a person's observations, constitute the person's evidence. This view leads to epistemic self-defeat. There are three arguments, concerning respectively: (1) epistemic starting points; (2) epistemic norms; (3) terms of epistemic appraisal. The source of self-defeat is traced to the fact that empiricism does not count a priori intuition as evidence (where a priori intuition is not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   29 citations  
  7. Davidsons's Objections to Quine's Empiricism.Lars Bergström - 2001 - In P. Pagin P. Kotatko (ed.), Interpreting Davidson. CSLI Publications.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8. Gupta's Gambit.Selim Berker - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.
    After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9. Recensioni-La naturalizzazione dell'epistemologia. Contro una soluzione quineana by Nicla Vassallo.P. Garavaso - 2001 - Epistemologia 24 (2):367-370.
    Quine, criticism of Quine's Naturalized Epistemology.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Russell Gillian - 2014 - In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W.V.O. Quine. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 181-202.
    A critical survey of Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. On Properties.Albert Halliday - manuscript
    In this paper I will argue that ‘colour’ is not in real objects. I will then go beyond that to argue that properties of real objects – if they have properties – cannot be emitted to the perceiver. It becomes necessary, therefore, to hold that all that is ‘known’, via the senses, of the world be inferred from the Representation only.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Fifteen Years of a Classic: New Humean Studies.Leandro Hollanda - 2017 - Prometeus 23:139-150.
    "I tend to agree with more dialectical positions such as Noxon's who, even being a critic of the approach of the two concepts, writes the following: Hume explained certain mental phenomena, notably belief, as effects of the association. And, going further, I say that belief is a feeling or sensation aroused by two factors: habit and the association of ideas, but it does not arise either from one or from other singly, each one is a part of a process that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Kantian Neuroscience and Radical Interpretation.Jim Hopkins - forthcoming - In Festschfrift for Mark Platts.
    This is an unedited version of a paper written in 2012 accepted for publication in a forthcoming Festschrift for Mark Platts. In it I argue that the Helmholtz/Bayes tradition of free energy neuroscience begun by Geoffrey Hinton and his colleagues, and now being carried forward by Karl Friston and his, can be seen as a fulfilment of the Quine/Davidson program of radical interpretation, and also of Quine’s conception of a naturalized epistemology. -/- This program, in turn, is rooted in Helmholtz’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning.Michael Huemer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):592-613.
    The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite regress. Nor does subjective Bayesianism offer a way out for the empiricist. Despite often-cited convergence theorems, subjective (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Does Probability Collapse or Retroact?Masaki Ichinose - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 23.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Reductive Identities: An Empirical Fundamentalist Approach.Douglas Kutach - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):67-101.
    I sketch a philosophical program called ‘Empirical Fundamentalism,’ whose signature feature is the extensive use of a distinction between fundamental and derivative reality. Within the framework of Empirical Fundamentalism, derivative reality is treated as an abstraction from fundamental reality. I show how one can understand reduction and supervenience in terms of abstraction, and then I apply the introduced machinery to understand the relation between water and H2O, mental states and brain states, and so on. The conclusion is that such relations (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Empirical Analyses of Causation.Douglas Kutach - 2009 - In Allan Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Conceptual analyses can be subdivided into two classes, good and evil. Em- pirical analysis is the good kind, routinely practiced in the sciences. Orthodox analysis is the malevolent version that plagues philosophical discourse. In this paper, I will clarify the difference between them, provide some reasons to prefer good over evil, and illustrate their consequences for the metaphysics of causation. By conducting an empirical analysis of causation rather than an orthodox analysis, one can segregate the genuine metaphysical problems that need (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Popper's Paradoxical Pursuit of Natural Philosophy.Nicholas Maxwell - 2016 - In J. Shearmur & G. Stokes (eds.), Cambridge Companion to Popper. Cambridge University Press. pp. 170-207.
    Philosophy of science is seen by most as a meta-discipline – one that takes science as its subject matter, and seeks to acquire knowledge and understanding about science without in any way affecting, or contributing to, science itself. Karl Popper’s approach is very different. His first love is natural philosophy or, as he would put it, cosmology. This intermingles cosmology and the rest of natural science with epistemology, methodology and metaphysics. Paradoxically, however, one of his best known contributions, his proposed (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. What’s Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism?Nicholas Maxwell - 2015 - Acta Baltica Historiae Et Philosophiae Scientiarum 3 (2):5-31.
    For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity of the argument for (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. A Priori Conjectural Knowledge in Physics: The Comprehensibility of the Universe.Nicholas Maxwell - 2011 - In Michael Veber & Michael Shaffer (eds.), What Place for the A Priori? Chicago: Open Court. pp. 211-240.
    In this paper I argue for a priori conjectural scientific knowledge about the world. Physics persistently only accepts unified theories, even though endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals are always available. This persistent preference for unified theories, against empirical considerations, means that physics makes a substantial, persistent metaphysical assumption, to the effect that the universe has a (more or less) unified dynamic structure. In order to clarify what this assumption amounts to, I solve the problem of what it means (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. Is Empiricism Empirically False? Lessons From Early Nervous Systems.Marcin Miłkowski - 2017 - Biosemiotics 10 (2):229-245.
    Recent work on skin-brain thesis suggests the possibility of empirical evidence that empiricism is false. It implies that early animals need no traditional sensory receptors to be engaged in cognitive activity. The neural structure required to coordinate extensive sheets of contractile tissue for motility provides the starting point for a new multicellular organized form of sensing. Moving a body by muscle contraction provides the basis for a multicellular organization that is sensitive to external surface structure at the scale of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Alexandre Joseph Hidulphe Vincent on George Gemistos Plethon.Katelis Viglas - 2012 - Anistoriton Journal of History, Archaeology and ArtHistory 13 (1):1-12.
    George Gemistos Plethon’s work in all its dimensions has attracted many scholars across the ages. One of those scholars was Alexandre Joseph Hidulphe Vincent, a French mathematician and erudite, who in the first and the only critical edition of Plethon’s Book of Laws by C. Alexandre in the nineteenth century, added three notes on his calendar, metrics and music, as he could reconstruct them from the ancient text. Vincent’s calculations were dictated by the main scientific thought of his time, which (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Deficiency Arguments Against Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Indefeasibility.Lisa Warenski - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1675-1686.
    I give a brief overview of Albert Casullo’s Essays on A Priori Knowledge and Justification, followed by a summary of his diagnostic framework for evaluating accounts of a priori knowledge and a priori justification. I then discuss Casullo’s strategy for countering deficiency arguments against empiricism. A deficiency argument against empiricism can be countered by mounting a parallel argument against moderate rationalism that shows moderate rationalism to be defective in a similar way. I argue that a particular deficiency argument put forth (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography