Referent Tracking: The Problem of Negative Findings

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Abstract
The paradigm of referent tracking is based on a realist presupposition which rejects so-called negative entities (congenital absent nipple, and the like) as spurious. How, then, can a referent tracking-based Electronic Health Record deal with what are standardly called ‘negative findings’? To answer this question we carried out an analysis of some 748 sentences drawn from patient charts and containing some form of negation. Our analysis shows that to deal with these sentences we need to introduce a new ontological relationship between a particular and a universal, which holds when no instance of the universal has a specific qualified ontological relation with the particular. This relation is found to be able to accommodate nearly all occurrences of negative findings in the examined sample, in ways which involve no reference to negative entities.
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Archival date: 2019-08-09
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References found in this work BETA
Against Fantology.Barry Smith - 2005 - In Johann C. Marek & Maria E. Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis. HPT&ÖBV. pp. 153-170.
Strategies for Referent Tracking in Electronic Health Records.Werner Ceusters & Barry Smith - 2006 - Journal of Biomedical Informatics 39 (3):362-378.
Biodynamic Ontology: Applying BFO in the Biomedical Domain.Barry Smith, Pierre Grenon & Louis Goldberg - 2004 - Studies in Health and Technology Informatics 102:20–38.

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Citations of this work BETA
Introduction: What is Ontology For.Katherine Munn - 2008 - In Munn Katherine & Smith Barry (eds.), Applied Ontology: An Introduction. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 7-19.
Concept Systems and Ontologies: Recommendations for Basic Terminology.Gunnar O. Klein & Barry Smith - 2010 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 25 (3):433-441.

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