What Intuitions Are Like

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The upshot is that intuitions are importantly similar to perceptual experiences, and so should not be identified with doxastic attitudes or dispositions. I consider a popular argument from the introspective absence of sui generis intuition experiences in favor of doxasticism. I develop a conception of intuition experiences that helps to defuse this argument.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CHUWIA-2
Revision history
First archival date: 2010-05-18
Latest version: 2 (2017-02-02)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.McDowell, John
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

View all 88 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 36 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2010-05-18

Total views
1,028 ( #1,874 of 41,569 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
63 ( #8,932 of 41,569 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.