Agency and Incompatibilism [Book Review]

Res Philosophica 91 (3):519-525 (2014)
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Abstract
This paper is part of a symposium discussing Helen Steward's A METAPHYSICS FOR FREEDOM. Steward argues for what she calls Agency Incompatibilism: agency itself is incompatible with determinism. This paper examines what Steward presents as her main argument for Agency Incompatibilism and finds it wanting.
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Archival date: 2014-09-29
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Actions.Hornsby, Jennifer

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