Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions

Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177 (2013)
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In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
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First archival date: 2013-08-20
Latest version: 2 (2014-05-20)
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