Interpolating Decisions

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):327-339 (2023)
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Abstract

Decision theory requires agents to assign probabilities to states of the world and utilities to the possible outcomes of different actions. When agents commit to having the probabilities and/or utilities in a decision problem defined by objective features of the world, they may find themselves unable to decide which actions maximize expected utility. Decision theory has long recognized that work-around strategies are available in special cases; this is where dominance reasoning, minimax, and maximin play a role. Here we describe a different work around, wherein a rational decision about one decision problem can be reached by ‘interpolating’ information from another problem that the agent believes has already been rationally solved.

Author Profiles

Elliott Sober
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Jonathan Cohen
University of California, San Diego

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