Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement

In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Richard Rowland (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. Routledge (forthcoming)
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This chapter serves as an opinionated introduction to the problem of convergence (that there is no clear convergence to the truth in philosophy) and the problem of peer disagreement (that disagreement with a peer rationally demands suspending one’s beliefs), and some of the issues they give rise to, namely, philosophical skepticism and progress in philosophy. After introducing both topics and surveying the various positions in the literature we explore the prospects of an alternative, hinge-theoretic account.
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