Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)?

Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):316-337 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
A recent debate in Kant scholarship concerns the role of concepts in Kant's theory of perception. Roughly, proponents of a conceptualist interpretation argue that for Kant, the possession of concepts is a prior condition for perception, while nonconceptualist interpreters deny this. The debate has two parts. One part concerns whether possessing empirical concepts is a prior condition for having empirical intuitions. A second part concerns whether Kant allows empirical intuitions without a priori concepts. Outside of Kant interpretation, the contemporary debate about conceptualism concerns whether perception requires empirical concepts. But, as I argue, the debate about whether Kant allows intuitions without empirical concepts does not show whether Kant is a conceptualist. Even if Kant allows intuitions without empirical concepts, it could still be that a priori concepts are required. While the debate could show that Kant is a conceptualist, I argue it does not. Finally, I sketch a novel way that the conceptualist interpreter might win the debate—roughly, by arguing that possessing a priori concepts is a prior condition for having appearances
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CONWKC
Upload history
Archival date: 2013-06-19
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-06-20

Total views
876 ( #3,911 of 52,730 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
37 ( #17,111 of 52,730 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.