Moral Evaluation Shapes Linguistic Reports of Others' Psychological States, Not Theory-of-Mind Judgments

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):334-335 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2011-03-01
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment.Pettit, Dean & Knobe, Joshua

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
On Doing Things Intentionally.Jacob, Pierre; Florian, Cova & Emmanuel, Dupoux

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total downloads
370 ( #6,473 of 37,122 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #19,965 of 37,122 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.