Delusion, Proper Function, and Justification

Neuroethics 14 (2):113-124 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Among psychiatric conditions, delusions have received significant attention in the philosophical literature. This is partly due to the fact that many delusions are bizarre, and their contents interesting in and of themselves. But the disproportionate attention is also due to the notion that by studying what happens when perception, cognition, and belief go wrong, we can better understand what happens when these go right. In this paper, I attend to delusions for the second reason—by evaluating the epistemology of delusions, we can better understand the epistemology of ordinary belief. More specifically, given recent advancements in our understanding of how delusions are formed, the epistemology of delusions motivates a proper functionalist account of the justification of belief. Proper functionalist accounts of the justification of belief hold that whether a belief is justified is partly determined by whether the system that produces the belief is functioning properly. Whatever pathology is responsible for delusion formation, restoring it to its proper function resolves the epistemic condition, an effect which motivates proper functionalism.
Reprint years
2021
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CRUDPF
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-01-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-01-21

Total views
306 ( #25,691 of 71,165 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #26,938 of 71,165 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.