Unknowable Color Facts

Mind (forthcoming)
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It is common for an object to present different color appearances to different perceivers, even when the perceivers and viewing conditions are normal. For example, a Munsell chip might look unique green to you and yellowish green to me in normal viewing conditions. In such cases, there are three possibilities. Ecumenism: Both experiences are veridical. Nihilism: Both experiences are non-veridical. Inegalitarianism: One experience is veridical and the other is non-veridical. Perhaps the most important objection to inegalitarianism is the ignorance objection, according to which inegalitarianism should be rejected because it is committed to the existence of unknowable color facts (e.g., facts about which objects are unique green). The goal of this paper is to show that ecumenists are also committed to unknowable color facts. More specifically, I argue that, with the exception of color eliminativism, all major philosophical theories of color are committed to unknowable color facts.
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Archival date: 2020-08-10
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