- Our Body Is the Measure: Malebranche and the Body-Relativity of Sensory Perception.Colin Chamberlain - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy.details
- Pain as a secondary quality: a phenomenological approach.Alejandro Escudero-Morales - forthcoming - Problemos:1-19.details
- Intention, Judgement-Dependence and Self-Deception.Ali Hossein Khani - forthcoming - Res Philosophica.details
- Hume's Incredible Demonstrations.Graham Clay - 2022 - Hume Studies 47 (1):55-77.details
- Unknowable Colour Facts.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):909-941.details
- Synesthesia, Hallucination, and Autism.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2021 - Frontiers in Bioscience 26:797-809.details
- The Epistemological Power of Taste.Louise Richardson - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3):398-416.details
- ‘Let us imagine that God has made a miniature earth and sky’: Malebranche on the Body-Relativity of Visual Size.Colin Chamberlain - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (2):206-224.details
- Many Molyneux Questions.Mohan Matthen & Jonathan Cohen - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):47-63.details
- Critique bungéenne de la réflexion de Meillassoux sur les mathématiques.Martín Orensanz - 2020 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 1:159-175.details
- A Critique of Meillassoux’s Reflections on Mathematics From the Perspective of Bunge’s Philosophy.Martín Orensanz - 2020 - Mεtascience: Scientific General Discourse 1:115-133.details
- Turning up the volume on the property view of sound.Pendaran Roberts - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):337-357.details
- Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):682-703.details
- Loving People for Who They Are (Even When They Don't Love You Back).Sara Protasi - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):214-234.details
- Primary and secondary qualties.Peter W. Ross - 2016 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 405-421.details
- Perceiving Bodies Immediately: Thomas Reid's Insight.Marina Folescu - 2015 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 32 (1):19-36.details
- Sensazioni o proprietà sensibili? Lo statuto ontologico dei qualia in fenomenologia.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2015 - In Roberta Lanfredini (ed.), Architettura della conoscenza e ontologia. Mimesis. pp. 157-187.details
- Seeing White and Wrong: Reid on the Role of Sensations in Perception, with a Focus on Color Perception.Lucas Thorpe - 2015 - In Rebecca Copenhaver & Todd Buras (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 100-123.details
- Two types of qualia theory.Pär Sundström - 2014 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 20:107-131.details
- Are colours visually complex?Pär Sundström - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag.details
- Redness, Reality, and Relationalism: Reply to Gert and Allen.Jonathan Cohen - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):351-378.details
- Thomas Aquinas, Perceptual Resemblance, Categories, and the Reality of Secondary Qualities.Paul Symington - 2011 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85:237-252.details
- Color Experience: A Semantic Theory.Mohan Matthen - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press. pp. 67--90.details
- Sensory qualities, sensible qualities, sensational qualities.Alex Byrne - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- The Situation-Dependency of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.details
- The mind-body problem and explanatory dualism.Nicholas Maxwell - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (291):49-71.details
- The structures of the common-sense world.Barry Smith - 1995 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 58:290–317.details
- Sensory Representation and Cognitive Architecture: An alternative to phenomenal concepts.Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab - manuscriptdetails
- A Reply to "Sensory Qualities...": A letter to Alex Byrne from a perplexed reader.Gerald D. Lame - manuscriptdetails
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