Atemporalism and Dependence

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Abstract
It is widely thought that Atemporalism—the view that, because God is “outside” of time, he does not foreknow anything (rather, his knowledge is timeless)—constitutes a unique solution to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge. However, as I argue here, in order for Atemporalism to escape certain worries (raised independently by Alvin Plantinga and Linda Zagzebski), the view must appeal to the dependence of God’s timeless knowledge on our actions. I then argue that, because it must appeal to such dependence, Atemporalism is crucially similar to the recent sempiternalist accounts proposed by Trenton Merricks, Philip Swenson, and Jonathan Westphal, and I conclude by briefly sketching some implications of this result.
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Archival date: 2020-02-07
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