Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence: A Dialectical Intervention

American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):145-154 (2020)
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Abstract

Recently, several authors have utilized the notion of dependence to respond to the traditional argument for the incompatibility of freedom and divine foreknowledge. However, proponents of this response have not always been so clear in specifying where the incompatibility argument goes wrong, which has led to some unfounded objections to the response. We remedy this dialectical confusion by clarifying both the dependence response itself and its interaction with the standard incompatibility argument. Once these clarifications are made, it becomes clear both (1.) that the dependence response does not beg the question against the proponent of the incompatibility argument and (2.) that the dependence response advances the dialectic whether it is developed as a version of Ockhamism or as a version of multiple-pasts compatibilism.

Author Profiles

Taylor W. Cyr
Samford University
Andrew Law
Universit├Ąt Hannover

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