Epistemic Uniqueness and the Practical Relevance of Epistemic Practices

Philosophia 45 (4):1721-1733 (2017)
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By taking the practical relevance of coordinated epistemic standards into account, Dogramaci and Horowitz (2016) as well as Greco and Hedden (2016) offer a new perspective on epistemic permissiveness. However, in its current state, their argument appears to be inconclusive. I will offer two reasons why this argument does not support interpersonal uniqueness in general. First, such an argument leaves open the possibility that distinct closed societies come to incompatible epistemic standards. Second, some epistemic practices like the promotion of methodological heterogeneity in epistemic communities could be best explained by epistemic permissiveness.
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First archival date: 2017-07-07
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