Should agents be immodest?

Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):235-251 (2020)
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Abstract

Epistemically immodest agents take their own epistemic standards to be among the most truth-conducive ones available to them. Many philosophers have argued that immodesty is epistemically required of agents, notably because being modest entails a problematic kind of incoherence or self-distrust. In this paper, I argue that modesty is epistemically permitted in some social contexts. I focus on social contexts where agents with limited cognitive capacities cooperate with each other (like juries).

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Marc-Kevin Daoust
École de Technologie Supérieure

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