Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-10 (2016)
AbstractThere are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted.
Archival historyArchival date: 2016-03-16
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