Are our moral responsibility practices justified? Wittgenstein, Strawson and justification in ‘Freedom and Resentment’

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Abstract
D. Justin Coates argues that, in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, P. F. Strawson develops a modest transcendental argument for the legitimacy of our moral responsibility practices. I disagree with Coates’ claim that Strawson’s argument provides a justification, in Wittgenstein’s and/or Strawson’s sense of that term, of our responsibility practices. I argue that my interpretation of Strawson solves some difficulties with Coates’ argument, while retaining its advantages.
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Archival date: 2020-04-02
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The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility.De Mesel, Benjamin & Heyndels, Sybren

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