Real Talk on the Metaphysics of Gender

Philosophical Topics (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Gender classifications often are controversial. These controversies typically focus on whether gender classifications align with facts about gender kind membership: Could someone really be nonbinary? Is Chris Mosier (a trans man) really a man? I think this is a bad approach. Consider the possibility of ontological oppression, which arises when social kinds operating in a context unjustly constrain the behaviors, concepts, or affect of certain groups. Gender kinds operating in dominant contexts, I argue, oppress trans and nonbinary persons in this way: they marginalize trans men and women and exclude nonbinary persons. As a result, facts about membership in dominant gender kinds should not settle gender classification practices.
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First archival date: 2019-01-17
Latest version: 3 (2019-02-05)
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References found in this work BETA
The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Quine, Willard V. O.
Doxastic Deliberation.Shah, Nishi & David Velleman, J.

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2019-01-17

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