The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment

In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 84–104 (2018)
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Abstract

This chapter examines the relevance of the cognitive science of morality to moral epistemology, with special focus on the issue of the reliability of moral judgments. It argues that the kind of empirical evidence of most importance to moral epistemology is at the psychological rather than neural level. The main theories and debates that have dominated the cognitive science of morality are reviewed with an eye to their epistemic significance.

Author Profiles

Joanna Demaree-Cotton
Oxford University
Guy Kahane
Oxford University

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