Moral Judgment

Edited by Leonard Kahn (Loyola University, New Orleans, US Naval Academy)
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  1. Improved Model Exploration for the Relationship Between Moral Foundations and Moral Judgment Development Using Bayesian Model Averaging.Hyemin Han & Kelsie J. Dawson - 2022 - Journal of Moral Education 51 (2):204-218.
    Although some previous studies have investigated the relationship between moral foundations and moral judgment development, the methods used have not been able to fully explore the relationship. In the present study, we used Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) in order to address the limitations in traditional regression methods that have been used previously. Results showed consistency with previous findings that binding foundations are negatively correlated with post-conventional moral reasoning and positively correlated with maintaining norms and personal interest schemas. In addition to (...)
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  2. Mental Control and Attributions of Blame for Negligent Wrongdoing.Samuel Murray, Kristina Krasich, Zachary C. Irving, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Felipe De Brigard - forthcoming - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
    Judgments of blame for others are typically sensitive to what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based on perceived mental control, or the degree to which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over time. To acquire information about others’ mental control, (...)
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  3. Dialéctica de lo general y lo particular en la verdad valorativa.José Ramón Fabelo Corzo - 1988 - In Felipe Sánchez Linares (ed.), ¿Es ciencia la filosofía? La Habana, Cuba: pp. 205-226.
    El trabajo aborda, desde una perspectiva marxista, un importante y complejo problema teórico asociado a la supuesta falsedad de toda ideología. Se trata del problema de la veracidad de la valoración, calificado más de una vez como de imposible solución, dado el vínculo de los juicios valorativos con las necesidades, intereses y otros fenómenos subjetivos de la conciencia humana. La negación de la existencia de la verdad valorativa conduce inevitablemente a su negación en la ideología, compuesta fundamentalmente por juicios valorativos (...)
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  4. Trolleys, Triage and Covid-19: The Role of Psychological Realism in Sacrificial Dilemmas.Markus Kneer & Ivar R. Hannikainen - 2022 - Cognition and Emotion 36 (1):137-153.
    At the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, frontline medical professionals at intensive care units around the world faced gruesome decisions about how to ration life-saving medical resources. These events provided a unique lens through which to understand how the public reasons about real-world dilemmas involving trade-offs between human lives. In three studies (total N = 2298), we examined people’s moral attitudes toward the triage of acute coronavirus patients, and found elevated support for utilitarian triage policies. These utilitarian tendencies did not (...)
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  5. The Disunity of Moral Judgment: Evidence and Implications.David Sackris & Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 1:1-20.
    We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment constitutes a distinctive category of judgment. We begin by reviewing evidence and arguments from neuroscience and philosophy that seem to indicate that a diversity of brain processes result in verdicts that we ordinarily consider “moral judgments”. We argue that if these findings are correct, this is plausible reason for doubting that all moral judgments necessarily share common features: if diverse brain processes give rise to what we (...)
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  6. Sensitive to Reasons: Moral Intuition and the Dual Process Challenge to Ethics.Dario Cecchini - 2022 - Dissertation,
    This dissertation is a contribution to the field of empirically informed metaethics, which combines the rigorous conceptual clarity of traditional metaethics with a careful review of empirical evidence. More specifically, this work stands at the intersection of moral psychology, moral epistemology, and philosophy of action. The study comprises six chapters on three distinct (although related) topics. Each chapter is structured as an independent paper and addresses a specific open question in the literature. The first part concerns the psychological features and (...)
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  7. Brains, Trains, and Ethical Claims: Reassessing the Normative Implications of Moral Dilemma Research.Michael T. Dale & Bertram Gawronski - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-25.
    Joshua Greene has argued that the empirical findings of cognitive science have implications for ethics. In particular, he has argued (1) that people’s deontological judgments in response to trolley problems are strongly influenced by at least one morally irrelevant factor, personal force, and are therefore at least somewhat unreliable, and (2) that we ought to trust our consequentialist judgments more than our deontological judgments when making decisions about unfamiliar moral problems. While many cognitive scientists have rejected Greene’s dual-process theory of (...)
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  8. What Roles Do Emotions Play in Morality?Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Andrea Scarantino (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. Routledge.
    This chapter offers an overview of four key debates about the roles of emotion in morality. First, many believe that emotions are an important psychological mechanism for explaining altruistic behavior and moral conscience in humans. Second, there is considerable debate about the causal role of affective reactions in moral judgment. Third, some philosophers have argued that emotions have a constitutive role in moral thought and even moral facts. Finally, philosophers disagree about whether affective influence undermines the justification of moral beliefs (...)
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  9. Measuring Impartial Beneficence: A Kantian Perspective on the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale.Emilian Mihailov - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    To capture genuine utilitarian tendencies, developed the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale based on two subscales, which measure the commitment to impartial beneficence and the willingness to cause harm for the greater good. In this article, I argue that the impartial beneficence subscale, which breaks ground with previous research on utilitarian moral psychology, does not distinctively measure utilitarian moral judgment. I argue that Kantian ethics captures the all-encompassing impartial concern for the well-being of all human beings. The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale draws, in (...)
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  10. The Difficulty of Understanding: Complexity and Simplicity in Moral Psychological Description.Camilla Kronqvist & Natan Elgabsi - 2021 - Scientia Moralitas 6 (2):78-103.
    The social intuitionist approach to moral judgments advanced by social psychologist Jonathan Haidt presupposes that it is possible to provide an explanation of the human moral sense without normative implications. By contrast, Iris Murdoch’s philosophical work on moral psychology suggests that every description of morality necessarily involves evaluative features that reveal the thinker’s own moral attitudes and implicit philosophical pictures. In the light of this, we contend that Haidt’s treatment of the story about Julie and Mark, two siblings who decide (...)
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  11. Children Prioritize Humans Over Animals Less Than Adults Do.Matti Wilks, Lucius Caviola, Guy Kahane & Paul Bloom - 2021 - Psychological Science 1 (32):27-38.
    Is the tendency to morally prioritize humans over animals weaker in children than adults? In two pre-registered studies (N = 622), 5- to 9-year-old children and adults were presented with moral dilemmas pitting varying numbers of humans against varying numbers of either dogs or pigs and were asked who should be saved. In both studies, children had a weaker tendency to prioritize humans over animals than adults. They often chose to save multiple dogs over one human, and many valued the (...)
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  12. Moral Judgement and Moral Progress: The Problem of Cognitive Control.Michael Klenk & Hanno Sauer - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (7):938-961.
    We propose a fundamental challenge to the feasibility of moral progress: most extant theories of progress, we will argue, assume an unrealistic level of cognitive control people must have over their moral judgments for moral progress to occur. Moral progress depends at least in part on the possibility of individual people improving their moral cognition to eliminate the pernicious influence of various epistemically defective biases and other distorting factors. Since the degree of control people can exert over their moral cognition (...)
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  13. The Rationality Premise.Juliette Christie - 1997 - [email protected] 9 (1):59-83.
    Many contemporary moral theories accept and rely upon a singular (often unstated) premise. Contractualisms, traditionally construed rights theories and Millian utilitarianisms all accept a uniquely indefensible claim about the nature of the moral value of rationality. As a result, these moral theories are, despite their differences, equally and seriously marked for reliance on what I will call "the rationality premise". In this work I explain how it is that said reliance guarantees that a theory is impervious to demonstration of soundness. (...)
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  14. Trolleys, Triage and Covid-19: The Role of Psychological Realism in Sacrificial Dilemmas.Markus Kneer & Ivar R. Hannikainen - 2021 - Cognition and Emotion 8.
    At the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, frontline medical professionals at intensive care units around the world faced gruesome decisions about how to ration life-saving medical resources. These events provided a unique lens through which to understand how the public reasons about real-world dilemmas involving trade-offs between human lives. In three studies (total N = 2298), we examined people’s moral attitudes toward triage of acute coronavirus patients, and found elevated support for utilitarian triage policies. These utilitarian tendencies did not stem (...)
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  15. Ethics and the Question of What to Do.Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Several recent debates in ethics and metaethics highlight what has been called the “central deliberative question.” For instance, in cases involving normative uncertainty, it is natural to ask questions like “I don’t know what I ought to do—*now* what ought I to do?” But it is not clear how this question should be understood, since what I ought to do is precisely what I do not know. Similar things can be said about questions raised by normative conflicts, so-called “alternative normative (...)
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  16. Does the Anthropocene Require Us to Be Saints?Bennett Gilbert - manuscript
    The question of the moral demands that humans, posthumans, and nonhumans in the Anthropocene put up on persons now living generally takes the form of supererogatory demands—that is, moral obligations with a perfectionist structure leading to obligations “above and beyond the call of duty” and extreme individual and collective sacrifice. David Roden construes this by deontology; Toby Ord, following Derek Parfit, by consequentualism. Such obligations are akin to the martyrdom of saints: but must our expectations of the Anthropocene necessarily lead (...)
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  17. The Influence of Situational Factors in Sacrificial Dilemmas on Utilitarian Moral Judgments.Michael Klenk - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-33.
    The standard way to test alternative descriptive theories of moral judgment is by asking subjects to evaluate sacrificial dilemmas, where acting classifies as a utilitarian moral judgment and not acting classifies as a deontological moral judgment. Previous research uncovered many situational factors that alter subject’s moral judgments without affecting which type of action utilitarianism or deontology would recommend. This literature review provides a systematic analysis of the experimental literature on the influence of situational factors on moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. (...)
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  18. Perceiving Utilitarian Gradients: Heart Rate Variability and Self-Regulatory Effort in the Moral Dilemma Task.Alejandro Rosas, Juan Pablo Bermúdez, Jorge Martínez Cotrina, David Aguilar-Pardo, Juan Carlos Caicedo Mera & Diego Mauricio Aponte - 2021 - Social Neuroscience 16 (4):391–405.
    It is not yet clear which response behavior requires self-regulatory effort in the moral dilemma task. Previous research has proposed that utilitarian responses require cognitive control, but subsequent studies have found inconsistencies with the empirical predictions of that hypothesis. In this paper we treat participants’ sensitivity to utilitarian gradients as a measure of performance. We confronted participants (N = 82) with a set of five dilemmas evoking a gradient of mean utilitarian responses in a 4-point scale and collected data on (...)
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  19. Conflicting Judgments and Weakness of Will.Nora Heinzelmann - 2020 - Philosophia 1 (1):255-269.
    This paper shows that our popular account of weakness of will is inconsistent with dilemmas. In dilemmas, agents judge that they ought to do one thing, that they ought to do something else, and that they cannot do both. They must act against either of their two judgments. But such action is commonly understood as weakness of will. An agent is weak-willed in doing something if she judges that she ought to and could do something else instead. Thus, it seems (...)
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  20. Cerebellum and Emotion in Morality.Hyemin Han - forthcoming - In Michael Adamaszek, Mario Manto & Denis Schutter (eds.), Cerebellum and Emotion.
    In the current chapter, I examined the relationship between the cerebellum, emotion, and morality with evidence from large-scale neuroimaging data analysis. Although the aforementioned relationship has not been well studied in neuroscience, recent studies have shown that the cerebellum is closely associated with emotional and social processes at the neural level. Also, debates in the field of moral philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience have supported the importance of emotion in moral functioning. Thus, I explored the potentially important but less-studies topic with (...)
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  21. Entre razões e emoções, qual é a saída? Como entender os casos de dumbfounding moral.Gustavo Oliva de Oliveira - 2020 - In Gustavo Oliva de Oliveira, Daniel Santos & Eduardo Alves (eds.), XX Semana Acadêmica do PPG em Filosofia da PUCRS Vol. 4. Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil: pp. 137-148.
    The suggestion that emotions are, in a way, essential to moral judgement has been getting attention in recent literature. Jesse Prinz says that emotionist theories involve at least one of the following claims: (i) emotions are necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of moral concepts (epistemic emotionism); (ii) emotions are necessary and sufficient to determine moral properties (metaphysical emotionism). According to Prinz, some empirical results in moral psychology can support these kinds of emotionism (especially the first one). In The emotional (...)
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  22. Experimental Philosophical Bioethics and Normative Inference.Brian D. Earp, Jonathan Lewis, Vilius Dranseika & Ivar R. Hannikainen - 2021 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 42 (3-4):91-111.
    This paper explores an emerging sub-field of both empirical bioethics and experimental philosophy, which has been called “experimental philosophical bioethics” (bioxphi). As an empirical discipline, bioxphi adopts the methods of experimental moral psychology and cognitive science; it does so to make sense of the eliciting factors and underlying cognitive processes that shape people’s moral judgments, particularly about real-world matters of bioethical concern. Yet, as a normative discipline situated within the broader field of bioethics, it also aims to contribute to substantive (...)
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  23. Does gratitude to R for ϕ-ing imply gratitude that R ϕ-ed?Tony Manela - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3245-3262.
    Many find it plausible that for a given beneficiary, Y, benefactor, R, and action, ϕ, Y’s being grateful to R for ϕ-ing implies Y’s being grateful that R ϕ-ed. According to some philosophers who hold this view, all instances of gratitude to, or “prepositional gratitude,” are also instances of gratitude that, or “propositional gratitude.” These philosophers believe there is a single unified concept of gratitude, a phenomenon that is essentially gratitude that, and whose manifestations sometimes have additional features that make (...)
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  24. A Survey of Effects of STS Education on the University Students' Moral Development and Epistemological Beliefs: Using DIT and EBI.Hyemin Han - 2006 - Journal of Ethics Education Studies 9:201-217.
    The purpose of this study is to assess effects of STS(Science and Technology Studies) education in natural science colleges and engineering colleges. STS is an interdisciplinary study includes ethics, history, sociology, policy of science and technology; its main purpose is elaborating students' social perspectives on science and technology. In Korea, however, there is few studies related to STS education to improve its educational effects. Therefore, this study will do exploratory investigation effects of STS education in moral development and epistemological beliefs (...)
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  25. Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker.Sebastian Hengst - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-14.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Derek Baker (Erkenntnis 83(4):829–852, 2018) raises an objection to expressivism as it has been developed by Mark Schroeder (Being for, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Baker argues that Schroeder’s expressivist (1) is committed to certain sentences expressing rationally incoherent states of mind, and he objects (2) that the expressivist cannot explain why these states would be rationally incoherent. The aim of this paper is to show that Baker’s argument for (1) is unsound, and (...)
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  26. Some Challenges for Research on Emotion and Moral Judgment: The Moral Foreign-Language Effect as a Case Study.Steven McFarlane & Heather Cipolletti Perez - 2020 - Diametros 17 (64):56-71.
    In this article, we discuss a number of challenges with the empirical study of emotion and its relation to moral judgment. We examine a case study involving the moral foreign-language effect, according to which people show an increased utilitarian response tendency in moral dilemmas when using their non-native language. One important proposed explanation for this effect is that using one’s non-native language reduces emotional arousal, and that reduced emotion is responsible for this tendency. We offer reasons to think that there (...)
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  27. Decision Under Normative Uncertainty.Franz Dietrich & Brian Jabarian - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy.
    While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the 'original position', where one's future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty -- normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle -- maximising expected value (`Expectationalism') -- has different formulations, namely (...)
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  28. Hume’s “Projectivism” Explained.Miren Boehm - 2020 - Synthese: Humeanisms.
    Hume appeals to a mysterious mental process to explain how to world appears to possess features that are not present in sense perceptions, namely causal, moral, and aesthetic properties. He famously writes that the mind spreads itself onto the external world, and that we stain or gild natural objects with our sentiments. Projectivism is founded on these texts but it assumes a reading of Hume’s language as merely metaphorical. This assumption, however, conflicts sharply with the important explanatory role that “spreading” (...)
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  29. La teoria dei sentimenti morali. [REVIEW]Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 3 (1):199-206.
    A discussion of the Italian edition of Adam Smith's moral work edited by Eugenio Lecaldano.
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  30. Death.Claudia Meadows - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Houston - Downtown
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  31. Can Literature Be Moral Philosophy? A Sceptical View on the Ethics of Literary Empathy.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 2011 - In Sebastian Hüsch (ed.), Philosophy and Literature and the Crisis of Metaphysics.
    One important aspect of Nussbaum´s thesis on the moral value of literature concerns the power of literature to enhance our ability to empathise with other minds. This aspect will be the focus of the current article. My aim is to reflect upon this question regarding the moral value of our empathy for fictional characters. The article is structured in two main parts. I will first examine the concept of “empathy” and distinguish between empathy for human beings and empathy for fictional (...)
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  32. Can We Measure Practical Wisdom?Jason Swartwood - 2020 - Journal of Moral Education 49 (1):71-97.
    ABSTRACTWisdom, long a topic of interest to moral philosophers, is increasingly the focus of social science research. Philosophers have historically been concerned to develop a rationally defensible account of the nature of wisdom and its role in the moral life, often inspired in various ways by virtue theoretical accounts of practical wisdom. Wisdom scientists seek to, among other things, define wisdom and its components so that we can measure them. Are the measures used by wisdom scientists actually measuring what philosophers (...)
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  33. Streumer on Non-Cognitivism and Reductivism About Normative Judgement.Daan Evers - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6):707-724.
    Bart Streumer believes that the following principle is true of all normative judgements: When two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of them is correct. Streumer argues that noncognitivists are unable to explain why is true, or our acceptance of it. I argue that his arguments are inconclusive. I also argue that our acceptance of is limited in the case of instrumental and epistemic normative judgements, and that the extent to which we do accept for such judgements can (...)
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  34. Hanno Sauer, Debunking Arguments in Ethics , Pp. Xi + 244. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2019 - Utilitas 8 (4):1-5.
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  35. Silence & Salience: On Being Judgmental.Neal Tognazzini - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Ernst Gerhard (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 256-269.
    This chapter explores the concept of judgmentalism: what it is and why it’s morally problematic. After criticizing an account offered by Gary Watson, the paper argues for a broader understanding of what it is to be judgmental, encompassing not just the overall beliefs that we form about someone else, but also the very pattern of our thoughts about those with whom we are involved in interpersonal relationships. The thesis is that to care about someone is to be oriented toward them, (...)
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  36. Non-Descriptive Relativism: Adding Options to the Expressivist Marketplace.Matthew Bedke - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:48-70.
    This chapter identifies a novel family of metaethical theories that are non-descriptive and that aim to explain the action-guiding qualities of normative thought and language. The general strategy is to consider different relations language might bear to a given content, where we locate descriptivity (or lack of it) in these relations, rather than locating it in a theory that begins with the expression of states of mind, or locating it in a special kind of content that is not way-things-might-be content. (...)
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  37. Analyzing Debunking Arguments in Moral Psychology: Beyond the Counterfactual Analysis of Influence by Irrelevant Factors.Joanna Demaree-Cotton - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 (e151):15-17.
    May assumes that if moral beliefs are counterfactually dependent on irrelevant factors, then those moral beliefs are based on defective belief-forming processes. This assumption is false. Whether influence by irrelevant factors is debunking depends on the mechanisms through which this influence occurs. This raises the empirical bar for debunkers and helps May avoid an objection to his Debunker’s Dilemma.
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  38. On the Practical Impossibility of Being Both Well-Informed and Impartial.Sveinung Sundfør Sivertsen - 2019 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 12 (1):52-72.
    Adam Smith argued that the ideal moral judge is both well-informed and impartial. As non-ideal moral agents, we tend only to be truly well-informed about those with whom we frequently interact. These are also those with whom we tend to have the closest affective bonds. Hence, those who are well-informed, like our friends, tend to make for partial judges, while those who are impartial, like strangers, tend to make for ill-informed ones. Combining these two traits in one person seems far (...)
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  39. The Interplay Between Resentment, Motivation, and Performance.Myisha Cherry - 2019 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 46 (2):147-161.
    ABSTRACTWhile anger in sports has been explored in philosophy, the phenomenon known as having a ‘chipped shoulder’ has not. In this paper I explore the nature, causes, and effects of playi...
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  40. Transcendental Sentimentalism.Aaron Franklin -
    Broadly construed, moral sentimentalism is the position that human emotions or sentiments play a crucial role in our best normative or descriptive accounts of moral value or judgments thereof. In this paper, I introduce and sketch a defense of a new form of moral sentimentalism I call “Transcendental Sentimentalism”. According to transcendental sentimentalism, having a sentimental response to an object is a necessary condition of the possibility of a subject counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge about that object. In unpacking (...)
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  41. Voting Rights for Older Children and Civic Education.Michael Merry & Anders Schinkel - 2016 - Public Affairs Quarterly 30 (3):197-213.
    The issue of voting rights for older children has been high on the political and philosophical agenda for quite some time now, and not without reason. Aside from principled moral and philosophical reasons why it is an important matter, many economic, environmental, and political issues are currently being decided—sometimes through indecision—that greatly impact the future of today’s children. Past and current generations of adults have, arguably, mortgaged their children’s future, and this makes the question whether (some) children should be granted (...)
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  42. Constructivism and the Problem of Normative Indeterminacy.Yair Levy - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (2):243-253.
    I describe a new problem for metaethical constructivism. The problem arises when agents make conflicting judgments, so that the constructivist is implausibly committed to denying they have any reason for any of the available options. The problem is illustrated primarily with reference to Sharon Street’s version of constructivism. Several possible solutions to the problem are explained and rejected.
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  43. How Much Should the People Know? Implications of Methodological Choices in The Study of Intentionality and Blame Ascriptions,.Maria Botero - 2016 - Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice 2 (12):101-113.
    Several studies have shown that people are more likely to attribute intentionality and blame to agents who perform actions that have harmful consequences. This kind of bias has problematic implications for jury decisions because it predicts that judgment in juries will malfunction if an action has a blameworthy effect. Most of these studies include in their design a vignette in which it is clear that agents have foreknowledge of the effects of their actions. This kind of design fails to replicate (...)
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  44. Selective Debunking Arguments, Folk Psychology, and Empirical Psychology.Daniel Kelly - 2014 - In Hagop Sarkissian & Jennifer Cole Wright (eds.), Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 130-147.
    Rather than set out an overarching view or take a stand on the debunking of morality tout court, in what follows I’ll explore a divide and conquer strategy. First, I will briefly sketch a debunking argument that, instead of targeting all of morality or human moral nature, has a more narrow focus—namely, the intuitive moral authority of disgust. The argument concludes that as vivid and compelling as they can be while one is in their grip, feelings of disgust should be (...)
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  45. Review of John McMillan, The Methods of Bioethics: An Essay in Meta-Bioethics.Jonathan Lewis - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics 19 (7):W4 - W5.
    Although McMillan recognizes that moral theory has its place, he suggests that by setting bioethics up as a discipline whose predominant issues are to do with theory, not only are students insulated from the broadness of its scope and the diversity of its methods, but the subject comes across as largely inaccessible to those without some formal train- ing in normative ethics and of limited practical signifi- cance to those dealing with concrete issues.
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  46. When You Think It's Bad It's Worse Than You Think: Psychological Bias and the Ethics of Negative Character Assessments.Hagop Sarkissian - 2015 - In Brian Bruya (ed.), The Philosophical Challenge from China. Cambridge, MA, USA: pp. 3-21.
    We often find ourselves thinking of others as boring, nauseating, dim, dodgy, clumsy, or otherwise irritating or unpleasant. What’s the right thing to do when we have such thoughts? Some philosophers argue we ought to be civil and conceal them, lest others pick up on them and feel disrespected. Drawing on experimental psychology and classical Confucianism, I argue otherwise, suggesting that we ought to (literally) doubt such appraisals and be wary of their veracity.
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  47. Developmental Level of Moral Judgment Influences Behavioral Patterns During Moral Decision-Making.Hyemin Han, Kelsie J. Dawson, Stephen J. Thoma & Andrea L. Glenn - forthcoming - Journal of Experimental Education.
    We developed and tested a behavioral version of the Defining Issues Test-1 revised (DIT-1r), which is a measure of the development of moral judgment. We conducted a behavioral experiment using the behavioral Defining Issues Test (bDIT) to examine the relationship between participants’ moral developmental status, moral competence, and reaction time when making moral judgments. We found that when the judgments were made based on the preferred moral schema, the reaction time for moral judgments was significantly moderated by the moral developmental (...)
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  48. Cognición Moral.Santiago Amaya - forthcoming - In Introducción a la filosofía de las ciencias cognitiva.
    Este artículo está escrito para una colección de ensayos introductorios sobre filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas. Es una revisión (selectiva) de la literatura sobre la psicología del juicio moral.
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  49. Che cosa sono le etiche applicate? Tre problemi preliminari.Fabio Fossa - 2018 - Etica E Politica (2):433-466.
    Lo scopo di questo saggio consiste nell’individuare un punto di partenza adeguato per lo sviluppo di una teoria filosofica delle etiche applicate, cioè di un discorso che si assuma il compito di comprendere che cosa siano le etiche applicate, quali siano le loro strutture principali, in che cosa consista la loro novità e quale significato esse rivestano nei confronti del pensiero morale. Un approccio organico e unitario a questi temi, tuttavia, non è ancora stato impostato. Per questo motivo si rende (...)
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  50. Delineating The Moral Domain in Moral Psychology.Renatas Berniūnas - 2014 - Problemos 86:90-101.
    The aim of this paper is to review current debate about the moral domain in the moral psychological literature. There is some vagueness in respect to the usage of the very concept of ‘morality’. This conceptual problem recently has been re-addressed by several authors. So far, there is little agreement, nobody seems to agree about how to delineate the moral domain from other ‘non-moral’ normative domains. Currently, there are several positions that disagree about the scope of morality, ranging from complete (...)
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