Abstract rationality: the 'logical' structure of attitudes

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
We present an abstract model of rationality theories that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. We construe rationality as coherence between one's attitudes, e.g., one's beliefs, values, and intentions. We introduce three 'logical' conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness, and closedness. They generalise the classic logical conditions on beliefs towards multiple attitudes, but contrast with standard rationality conditions such as transitivity for preferences, modus ponens for binary beliefs, additivity for probabilistic beliefs, and non-akrasia for intentions. We establish a formal correspondence between our three logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome's enquiry into the achievability of rationality through reasoning, we characterize the extent to which explicit reasoning can help one become more 'logical', i.e., acquire consistent, complete, or closed attitudes, respectively. Our analysis forms a bridge between rationality and logic, and enables logical talk about multi-attitude psychology.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-08-15
Latest version: 2 (2022-03-17)
View other versions
Added to PP

206 (#36,512)

6 months
56 (#13,625)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?