Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):146-173 (2017)
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Abstract
Austere relationism rejects the orthodox analysis of hallucinations and illusions as incorrect perceptual representations. In this article, I argue that illusions of optimal motion present a serious challenge for this view. First, I submit that austere-relationist accounts of misleading experiences cannot be adapted to account for IOMs. Second, I show that any attempt at elucidating IOMs within an austere-relationist framework undermines the claim that perceptual experiences fundamentally involve relations to mind-independent objects. Third, I develop a representationalist model of IOMs. The proposed analysis combines two ideas: Evans' dynamic modes of presentation and Fine's relational semantics for identity.
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2017
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Archival date: 2016-07-14
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References found in this work BETA
The Silence of the Senses.Travis, Charles S.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Martin, Michael G. F.
Time and the Observer.Dennett, Daniel C. & Marcel, Kinsbourne

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