Law's Authority is not a Claim to Preemption

In Wilfrid J. Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law. Oxford University Press. pp. 51 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Joseph Raz argues that legal authority includes a claim by the law to replace subjects’ contrary reasons. I reply that this cannot be squared with the existence of choice-of-evils defenses to criminal prosecutions, nor with the view that the law has gaps (which Raz shares). If the function of authority is to get individuals to comply better with reason than they would do if left to their own devices, it would not make sense for law to claim both to pre-empt our contrary reasons and to leave open spaces or catch-all exceptions which we must use our own devices to fill.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
EHRLAI
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-20
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-01-30

Total views
217 ( #14,306 of 40,626 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #21,738 of 40,626 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.