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  1. A Theory that Beats the Theory? Lineages, the Growth of Signs, and Dynamic Legal Interpretation.Marcin Matczak - manuscript
    Legal philosophers distinguish between a static and a dynamic interpretation of law. The former assumes that the meaning of the words used in a legal text is set at the moment of its enactment and does not change with time. The latter allows the interpreters to update the meaning and apply a contemporary understanding to the text. The dispute between these competing theories has significant ramifications for social and political life. To take an example, depending on the approach, the term (...)
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  2. Procedure-Content Interaction in Attitudes to Law and in the Value of the Rule of Law: An Empirical and Philosophical Collaboration.Noam Gur & Jonathan Jackson - forthcoming - In Meyerson Denise, Catriona Mackenzie & Therese MacDermott (eds.), Procedural Justice and Relational Theory: Philosophical, Empirical and Legal Perspectives. Routledge.
    This chapter begins with an empirical analysis of attitudes towards the law, which, in turn, inspires a philosophical re-examination of the moral status of the rule of law. In Section 2, we empirically analyse relevant survey data from the US. Although the survey, and the completion of our study, preceded the recent anti-police brutality protests sparked by the killing of George Floyd, the relevance of our observations extends to this recent development and its likely reverberations. Consistently with prior studies, we (...)
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  3. Legal Obligation and Ability.Samuel Kahn - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
    In Wilmot-Smith’s recent ‘Law, “Ought”, and “Can”,’ he argues that legal obligation does not imply ability. In this short reply, I show that Wilmot-Smith’s arguments do not withstand critical scrutiny. In section 1, I attack Wilmot-Smith’s argument for the claim that allowing for impossible obligations makes for a better legal system, and I introduce positive grounds for thinking otherwise. In section 2, I show that, even if Wilmot-Smith had established that impossible obligations make for a better legal system, his subsequent (...)
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  4. Public Reason Naturalism.James Dominic Rooney - forthcoming - American Journal of Jurisprudence.
    I will argue that the natural law theory of morality, when extended into a political theory of justice, results in a picture of political justice much like that of public reason liberalism. However, natural law political theory, I argue, need not entail a natural law theory of morality. While facts about what societies ought to do supervene upon facts about what is good for human beings, there are distinct goods involved and distinct reasons for action. Rather, considerations taken from the (...)
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  5. Regulative Rules: A Distinctive Normative Kind.Reiland Indrek - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):772-791.
    What are rules? In this paper I develop a view of regulative rules which takes them to be a distinctive normative kind occupying a middle ground between orders and normative truths. The paradigmatic cases of regulative rules that I’m interested in are social rules like rules of etiquette and legal rules like traffic rules. On the view I’ll propose, a rule is a general normative content that is in force due to human activity: enactment by an authority or acceptance by (...)
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  6. Social Norms and Social Practices.John Lawless - 2023 - Philosophy and Social Criticism:1-27.
    Theories of social norms frequently define social norms in terms of individuals’ beliefs and preferences, and so afford individual beliefs and preferences conceptual priority over social norms. I argue that this treatment of social norms is unsustainable. Taking Bicchieri’s theory as an exemplar of this approach, I argue, first, that Bicchieri’s framework bears important structural similarities with the command theory of law; and second, that Hart’s arguments against the command theory of law, suitably recast, reveal the fundamental problems with Bicchieri’s (...)
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  7. The Second-Class Citizen in Legal Theory.Jack Samuel - 2023 - Modern Law Review.
    This essay is a critical notice of David Dyzenhaus's book, The Long Arc of Legality. I argue that Dyzenhaus’s criterion for distinguishing legal pathologies that undermine law's contractarian claim to legitimacy and political pathologies that do not is unsustainable. It relies on a categorical distinction between the threat to law's legitimacy posed by treating some subjects as de jure second-class citizens, whose formal legal status is compromised, and other threats to political legitimacy grounded in the treatment of some subjects as (...)
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  8. The Possibility and Defensibility of NonState ‘Censorship’.Andrew Jason Cohen & Andrew I. Cohen - 2022 - In J. P. Messina (ed.), New Directions in the Ethics and Politics of Speech. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 13-31.
    Whether Social Media Companies (hereafter, SMCs) such as Twitter and Facebook limit speech is an empirical question. No one disputes that they do. Whether they “censor” speech is a conceptual question, the answer to which is a matter of dispute. Whether they may do so is a moral question, also a matter of dispute. We address both of these latter questions and hope to illuminate whether it is morally permissible for SMCs to restrict speech on their platforms. This could be (...)
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  9. Can Normative Accounts of Discrimination Be Guided by Anti-discrimination Law? Should They?Rona Dinur - 2022 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 15 (2):aa–aa.
    In her recent book, Faces of Inequality (2020), Moreau aims at developing a normative account of discrimination that is guided by the main features of anti-discrimination law. The critical comment argues against this methodology, indicating that due to indeterminacy relative to their underlying normative principles, central anti-discrimination norms cannot fulfill this guiding role. Further, using the content of such norms to guide ethical discussions is likely to be misleading, as it reflects evidentiary considerations that are unique to the legal context. (...)
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  10. Neuroscience and Normativity: How Knowledge of the Brain Offers a Deeper Understanding of Moral and Legal Responsibility.William Hirstein - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):327-351.
    Neuroscience can relate to ethics and normative issues via the brain’s cognitive control network. This network accomplishes several executive processes, such as planning, task-switching, monitoring, and inhibiting. These processes allow us to increase the accuracy of our perceptions and our memory recall. They also allow us to plan much farther into the future, and with much more detail than any of our fellow mammals. These abilities also make us fitting subjects for responsibility claims. Their activity, or lack thereof, is at (...)
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  11. Hobbes y Raz, dos modelos opuestos de autoridad. Consideraciones sobre similitudes, diferencias y (falta de) utilidad práctica.Julieta A. Rabanos - 2022 - Eunomia - Revista En Cultura De La Legalidad 23:47-64.
    El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar dos modelos específicos de discurso sobre la autoridad: un modelo que llamaré «hobbesiano» (representado por Thomas Hobbes) y un modelo que llamaré «raziano» (representado por Joseph Raz). Por un lado, intentaré mostrar que, pese a algunas aparentes similitudes, estos dos modelos son ejemplos de visiones opuestas acerca del tipo de autoridad, y del rol y las consecuencias que se le asignan a ésta en el marco del fenómeno jurídico y social. Por el otro, (...)
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  12. Menschenwürde, Persönlichkeit und die verfassungsmäßige Kontrolle. Oder: starke Normativität ohne Metaphysik?Wei Feng - 2021 - Archiv Für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 165:23-61.
    The concept of human dignity has been criticized as either too thick or too thin. However, according to the non-positivistic standpoint, the legal normativity of human dignity can be justified and thus strengthened by means of its moral correctness. From the individual perspective, Mencius’ understanding of human dignity as an intrinsic value and Kant’s formula of ‘man as an end in itself’ can be adequately understood based on the differentiation of, as well as the connection between, principium diiudicationis and principium (...)
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  13. Objetividad de los deberes y razones para la acción. Notas desde el externalismo.Sebastián Figueroa Rubio - 2021 - Doxa: Cuadernos de Filosofía Del Derecho 44:521-541.
    This article explores how externalism about reasons for action contributes to understanding the relations between agents and norms. In order to do this, firstly, the distinction between internalism and externalism is presented; secondly, some flaws of internalism regarding the objectivity of duties are analysed; lastly, externalism is defend-ed from the criticism according to which the principle «ought implies can» cannot be explained.
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  14. Veřejný rozum a právo [Public Reason and Law].Pavel Dufek - 2020 - In Tomáš Sobek & Martin Hapla (eds.), Filosofie práva [Philosophy of Law]. Brno, Czechia: pp. 227–254.
    The chapter explores the ways in which philosophical thinking about public reason and public justification can shed light on some deep issues regarding the legitimacy or purpose of law, as well as shallower yet no less important questions of constitutional engineering and institutional desing.
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  15. Reasons Internalism, Cooperation, and Law.Olof Leffler - 2020 - In Rachael Mellin, Raimo Tuomela & Miguel Garcia-Godinez (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 115-132.
    Argues that reasons internalism, suitably understood, explains categorical reasons for us to cooperate with each other. The norms we then cooperate to satisfy can lie at the heart of legal systems, yielding unexpected implications in the philosophy of law.
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  16. Hobbes’s third jurisprudence: legal pragmatism and the dualist menace.Benjamin L. S. Nelson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 33 (1).
    This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a ‘third way’ in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential ‘third theories’ of law -- legal pragmatism and legal dualism -- and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s treatment of civil law, and argue (...)
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  17. On the Nature of Legal Normativity, 37 Revus 83-91 (2019).Brian Bix - 2019 - Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law / Revija Za Ustavno Teorijo in Filozofijo Prava 37:83-91.
    In this response to eight commentaries on my article “Kelsen, Hart, and legal normativity” I clarify some points in my original analysis and agree with some comments regarding work that still needs to be done. In particular, I attempt to distinguish my position from both Berkeleyan idealism and mere subjective perception. I agree with the commentators who urge that more must be done to analyze the nature of normativity in general, and legal normativity in particular.
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  18. Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-104.
    This paper investigates whether different philosophers’ claims about “normativity” are about the same subject or (as recently argued by Derek Parfit) theorists who appear to disagree are really using the term with different meanings, in order to cast disambiguating light on the debates over at least the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of normativity. While I suggest the term may be multiply ambiguous, I also find reasons for optimism about a common subject-matter for metanormative theory. This is supported partly by (...)
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  19. Legal Facts and Reasons for Action: Between Deflationary and Robust Conceptions of Law’s Reason-Giving Capacity.Noam Gur - 2019 - In Frederick Schauer, Christoph Bezemek & Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac (eds.), The Normative Force of the Factual: Legal Philosophy Between is and Ought. Springer Verlag. pp. 151-170.
    This chapter considers whether legal requirements can constitute reasons for action independently of the merits of the requirement at hand. While jurisprudential opinion on this question is far from uniform, sceptical views are becoming increasingly dominant. Such views typically contend that, while the law can be indicative of pre-existing reasons, or can trigger pre-existing reasons into operation, it cannot constitute new reasons. This chapter offers support to a somewhat less sceptical position, according to which the fact that a legal requirement (...)
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  20. Legal Metanormativity: Lessons for and from Constitutivist Accounts in the Philosophy of Law.Kathryn Lindeman - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 87-104.
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  21. Laws as Conventional Norms.Nicholas Southwood - 2019 - In David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro & Kevin Toh (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    A persistent worry concerning conventionalist accounts of law is that such accounts are ill equipped to account for law’s special normativity. I offer a particular kind of conventionalist account that is based on the practice-dependent account of conventional norms I have offered elsewhere and consider whether it is vulnerable to the Normativity Objection. I argue that it isn’t. It can account for all the ways in which law can justly claim to be normative. While there are ways of being normative (...)
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  22. Kelsen, Hart, and Legal Normativity.Brian Bix - 2018 - Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law / Revija Za Ustavno Teorijo in Filozofijo Prava 34:25-42.
    This article focuses on issues relating to legal normativity, emphasizing the way these matters have been elaborated in the works of Kelsen and Hart and later commentators on their theories. First, in Section 2, the author offers a view regarding the nature of law and legal normativity focusing on Kelsen's work (at least one reasonable reading of it). The argument is that the Basic Norm is presupposed when a citizen chooses to read the actions of legal officials in a normative (...)
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  23. Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory.Stephen Finlay & David Plunkett - 2018 - In John Gardner, Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, vol. 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-86.
    Speech and thought about what the law is commonly function in practical ways, to guide or assess behavior. These functions have often been seen as problematic for legal positivism in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart. One recent response is to advance an expressivist analysis of legal statements (Toh), which faces its own, familiar problems. This paper advances a rival, positivist-friendly account of legal statements which we call “quasi-expressivist”, explicitly modeled after Finlay’s metaethical theory of moral statements. This consists in a (...)
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  24. Legal Directives and Practical Reasons.Noam Gur - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book investigates law's interaction with practical reasons. What difference can legal requirements—e.g. traffic rules, tax laws, or work safety regulations—make to normative reasons relevant to our action? Do they give reasons for action that should be weighed among all other reasons? Or can they, instead, exclude and take the place of some other reasons? The book critically examines some of the existing answers and puts forward an alternative understanding of law's interaction with practical reasons. -/- At the outset, two (...)
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  25. Recension de F. Schauer, Penser en Juriste. [REVIEW]Pierre Landou - 2018 - L'Oeil de Minerve:2018.
    Recension de la traduction française de l'ouvrage de F. Schauer, Penser en Juriste, Dalloz, 2018.
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  26. Introduction: Symposium on Paul Gowder, the rule of law in the real world.Matthew J. Lister - 2018 - St. Louis University Law Journal 62 (2):287-91.
    This is a short introduction to a book symposium on Paul Gowder's recent book, _The Rule of Law in thee Real World_ (Cambridge University Press, 2016). The book symposium will appear in the St. Luis University Law Journal, 62 St. Louis U. L.J., -- (2018), with commentaries on Gowder's book by colleen Murphy, Robin West, Chad Flanders, and Matthew Lister, along with replies by Paul Gowder.
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  27. In defense of content-independence.Nathan Adams - 2017 - Legal Theory 23 (3):143-167.
    Discussions of political obligation and political authority have long focused on the idea that the commands of genuine authorities constitute content-independent reasons. Despite its centrality in these debates, the notion of content-independence is unclear and controversial, with some claiming that it is incoherent, useless, or increasingly irrelevant. I clarify content-independence by focusing on how reasons can depend on features of their source or container. I then solve the long-standing puzzle of whether the fact that laws can constitute content-independent reasons is (...)
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  28. The Methods of Normativity.Hass Binesh - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 30 (1):159.
    This essay is an examination of the relationship between phenomenology and analytic method in the philosophy of law. It proceeds by way of a case study, the requirement of compliance in Raz’s theory of mandatory norms. Proceeding in this way provides a degree of specificity that is otherwise neglected in the relevant literature on method. Drawing on insights from the philosophy of art and cognitive neuroscience, it is argued that the requirement of compliance is beset by a range of epistemological (...)
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  29. 評:謝世民編《理由轉向:規範性之哲學研究》. [REVIEW]Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2017 - Soochow Journal of Philosophical Studies 36:133-144.
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  30. Three kinds of intention in lawmaking.Marcin Matczak - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (6):651-674.
    The nature of legislative intent remains a subject of vigorous debate. Its many participants perceive the intent in different ways. In this paper, I identify the reason for such diverse perceptions: three intentions are involved in lawmaking, not one. The three intentions correspond to the three aspects of a speech act: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary. The dominant approach in legal theory holds that legislative intent is a semantic (locutionary) one. A closer examination shows that it is, in fact, an illocutionary (...)
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  31. La doctrine environnementaliste face à l'exigence de neutralité axiologique: de l'illusion à la réflexivité.Julien Bétaille - 2016 - Revue Juridique de L'Environnement:20-59.
    Confrontée à l’exigence de neutralité axiologique, comprise comme le rejet de tout jugement de valeur, la doctrine environnementaliste ne fait pas preuve d’une particulière originalité. Elle porte peu d’intérêt à cette exigence, son discours est inéluctablement affecté par les mêmes biais que ceux qui touchent les autres catégories de doctrine et elle y apporte aussi des réponses comparables. Elle met d’une part en place des processus d’objectivation dont la portée est limitée en raison de l’étroitesse de la communauté scientifique du (...)
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  32. Law as Plan and Artefact.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2016 - Jurisprudence 7 (2):325-340.
    Scott Shapiro’s theory that law is a social plan is helpful in seeing law essentially as a tool of human creation and as such is sympathetic to understanding law in terms of the social functions it performs, a method I argue for elsewhere. I focus here on two problems with the theory as presented. The planning theory does not adequately explain the persistence of law beyond the utility of those who implement it. Generally, plans can cease to exist as soon (...)
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  33. Ontology and Reason Giving in Law.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2016 - In Paweł Banaś, Adam Dyrda & Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki (eds.), Metaphilosophy of Law. Portland, Oregon: Hart. pp. 147-158.
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  34. Law’s Artifactual Nature: How Legal Institutions Generate Normativity.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2015 - In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds.), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency. Cambridge University Press. pp. 247-266.
    I argue that law is best understood as an institutionalized abstract artifact. Using the ideas of John Searle on institutions and Amie Thomasson on artifacts, I show how the law is capable of generating new reasons for action, arguing against recent work by David Enoch who holds that legal reason-giving is ultimately a form of triggering conditional reasons.
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  35. Sustainability, Public Health, and the Corporate Duty to Assist.Julian Friedland - 2015 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 34 (2):215-236.
    Several European and North American states encourage or even require, via good Samaritan and duty to rescue laws, that persons assist others in distress. This paper offers a utilitarian and contractualist defense of this view as applied to corporations. It is argued that just as we should sometimes frown on bad Samaritans who fail to aid persons in distress, we should also frown on bad corporate Samaritans who neglect to use their considerable multinational power to undertake disaster relief or to (...)
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  36. Deliberation, Responsibility, and Excusing Mistakes of Law.Alexander A. Guerrero - 2015 - Jurisprudence 6 (1):81-94.
    In ‘Excusing Mistakes of Law’, Gideon Yaffe sets out to ‘vindicate’ the claim ‘that mistakes of law never excuse’ by ‘identifying the truth that is groped for but not grasped by those who assert that ignorance of law is no excuse’. Yaffe does not offer a defence of the claim that mistakes of law never excuse. That claim, Yaffe argues, is false. Yaffe’s article is, rather, an effort to assess what plausible thought might be behind the idea that mistakes of (...)
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  37. Political Anarchism and Raz’s Theory of Authority.Bruno Leipold - 2015 - Res Publica 21 (3):309-329.
    This article argues that using Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority to reject philosophical anarchism can be affected by political anarchism. Whereas philosophical anarchism only denies the authority of the state, political anarchism claims that anarchism is a better alternative to the state. Raz’s theory holds that an institution has authority if it enables people to better conform with reason. I argue that there are cases where anarchism is an existing alternative to the state and better fulfils this condition. Consequently, (...)
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  38. Social Norms, The Invisible Hand, and the Law.Jonny Anomaly & Geoffrey Brennan - 2014 - University of Queensland Law Journal 33 (2).
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  39. The ethics of proposed euthanasia laws in Australia.Thomas F. Burns - 2014 - Dissertation, Monash University
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  40. Breaking Laws to Fix Broken Windows: A Revisionist Take on Order Maintenance Policing.Andrew Ingram - 2014 - Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law 19 (2):112-152.
    Today, there is a family of celebrated police strategies that teach the importance of cracking down on petty crime and urban nuisance as the key to effective crime control. Under the “broken windows” appellation, this strategy is linked in the public mind with New York City and the alleged successes of its police department in reducing the rate of crime over the past two decades. This paper is critical of such order maintenance approaches to policing: I argue that infringements of (...)
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  41. Vorwort.Herlinde Pauer-Studer & Julian Fink - 2014 - In Herlinde Pauer-Studer & Julian Fink (eds.), Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts: Das Rechtsdenken im Nationalsozialismus in Originaltexten. Suhrkamp. pp. 9-13.
    Wie war es möglich? Diese mit Blick auf den Nationalsozialismus und die Zeit von 1933 bis 1945 unausweichliche Frage stellt sich für jede Generation aufs Neue – und auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen. Im Gegensatz zur detaillierten historischen Aufarbeitung der NS-Zeit ist die philosophisch-theoretische Analyse der normativen Grundlagen des NS Systems ein bislang vernachlässigtes Gebietder Forschung. Die hier edierte Sammlung von Originaltextenführender Juristen, Rechtstheoretiker und Rechtsphilosophen, die dem nationalsozialistischen Regime loyal gegenüberstanden und an der rechtlichen Um- und Neugestaltung mitarbeiteten, will diese Lücke (...)
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  42. Sprawiedliwość a prawo w nauczaniu Jana Pawła II [Justice and Law in the Teaching of John Paul II].Marek Piechowiak - 2014 - Przegląd Tomistyczny 20:209-237.
    The contribution focuses on philosophical issues of justice of positive law in the light of the social teaching of John Paul II. The analyses start with consideration of anthropological foundations of justice as virtue, develop with the reflexion upon justice of actions realizing justice and finally arrive at examination of the criteria of justice of law. -/- It is argued that relations between a human being and goods (ends of actions) form ontological basis of natural law and justice of actions (...)
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  43. The Binding Force of Nascent Norms of International Law.Anthony R. Reeves - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 28 (1):145-166.
    Demonstrating that a developing norm is not yet well established in international law is frequently thought to show that states are not bound by the norm as law. More precisely, showing that a purported international legal norm has only limited support from well-established international legal sources is normally seen as sufficient to rebut an obligation on the part of subjects to comply with the norm in virtue of its legal status. I contend that this view is mistaken. Nascent norms of (...)
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  44. Metanormative Principles and Norm Governed Social Interaction.Berislav Žarnić & Gabriela Bašić - 2014 - Revus 22:105-120.
    Critical examination of Alchourrón and Bulygin’s set-theoretic definition of normative system shows that deductive closure is not an inevitable property. Following von Wright’s conjecture that axioms of standard deontic logic describe perfection-properties of a norm-set, a translation algorithm from the modal to the set-theoretic language is introduced. The translations reveal that the plausibility of metanormative principles rests on different grounds. Using a methodological approach that distinguishes the actor roles in a norm governed interaction, it has been shown that metanormative principles (...)
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  45. The Paradox of the Normativity of Law.René González de la Vega - 2013 - Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoria Del Derecho 7 (7):63-79.
    This paper deals with Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco’s answer to the paradox of the normativity of law: How can autonomous self-legislating persons act, without compromising their autonomy and their will, following legal rules? Regarding Rodriguez-Blanco’s answer, I offer two main critiques. The first one is based on Rodriguez-Blanco’s comments to David Enoch’s paper in which I argue against the idea that a descriptive theoretical account of law can, and should, give an answer to general problems of normativity due to the fact that (...)
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  46. Law's Authority is not a Claim to Preemption.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2013 - In Wilfrid J. Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical foundations of the nature of law. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 51.
    Joseph Raz argues that legal authority includes a claim by the law to replace subjects’ contrary reasons. I reply that this cannot be squared with the existence of choice-of-evils defenses to criminal prosecutions, nor with the view that the law has gaps (which Raz shares). If the function of authority is to get individuals to comply better with reason than they would do if left to their own devices, it would not make sense for law to claim both to pre-empt (...)
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  47. The Paradoxical Evolution of Law.L. Ali Khan - 2012 - Lewis and Clark Law Review 16 (1):337-361.
    This Essay presents law’s evolution as a paradoxical union of the finite and the infinite. At any given point in time, law is a finite body of norms, which can be identified. At the same time, law’s evolution is infinite because rule-mutations that alter those norms are indeterminable. In modern legal systems, law’s evolution occurs under the constraining influence of master texts, which provide normative durability by enshrining the fundamental norms of a legal system and fortifying them against change. Despite (...)
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  48. Legislative duty and the independence of law.J. H. Bogart - 1987 - Law and Philosophy 6 (2):187 - 203.
    This essay considers the nature of duties incumbent on legislators in virtue of the office itself. I argue that there is no duty for a legislator to enact a criminal law based on morality; there is no duty to incorporate substantive moral conditions into the criminal law; and there is therefore no duty derivable from the nature of the legislative office itself to make conditions of culpability depend on those of moral responsibility. Finally, I argue that the relation between morality (...)
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  49. On Tractarian law.Barry Smith - 1979 - In Smith Barry (ed.), Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Critical Rationalism. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. pp. 31-35.
    "'It is clear", wrote Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, "that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms" (6.422). But he insisted also that there must be some kind of ethical punishment and reward; "the reward", he tells us, "must be something pleasant, and the punishment something unpleasant" (ibid.). I argue that we can understand what Wittgenstein meant by "reward" and "punishment" by conceiving these notions as elements in a system of interrelated concepts (...)
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  50. Five Kinds of Perspectives on Legal Institutions.Corrado Roversi - manuscript
    There is at least one immediate sense in which legal discourse is perspectival: it qualifies acts and facts in the world on the basis of rules. Legal concepts are for the most part constituted by rules, both in the sense that rules define these concepts’ semantic content and that, in order to engage with legal practice, we must act according to those rules, not necessarily complying with them but at least having them in mind. This is the distinctive perspective of (...)
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