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  1. added 2020-06-17
    Reasons Internalism, Cooperation, and Law.Olof Leffler - forthcoming - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Rachael Mellin & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin: pp. 115-132.
    Argues that reasons internalism, suitably understood, explains categorical reasons for us to cooperate with each other. The norms we then cooperate to satisfy can lie at the heart of legal systems, yielding unexpected implications in the philosophy of law.
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  2. added 2020-06-17
    Political Anarchism and Raz’s Theory of Authority.Bruno Leipold - 2015 - Res Publica 21 (3):309-329.
    This article argues that using Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority to reject philosophical anarchism can be affected by political anarchism. Whereas philosophical anarchism only denies the authority of the state, political anarchism claims that anarchism is a better alternative to the state. Raz’s theory holds that an institution has authority if it enables people to better conform with reason. I argue that there are cases where anarchism is an existing alternative to the state and better fulfils this condition. Consequently, (...)
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  3. added 2020-06-12
    On the Nature of Legal Normativity, 37 Revus 83-91 (2019).Brian Bix - 2019 - Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law / Revija Za Ustavno Teorijo in Filozofijo Prava 37:83-91.
    In this response to eight commentaries on my article “Kelsen, Hart, and legal normativity” I clarify some points in my original analysis and agree with some comments regarding work that still needs to be done. In particular, I attempt to distinguish my position from both Berkeleyan idealism and mere subjective perception. I agree with the commentators who urge that more must be done to analyze the nature of normativity in general, and legal normativity in particular.
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  4. added 2020-06-12
    Non-Positivism and Encountering a Weakened Necessity of the Separation Between Law and Morality – Reflections on the Debate Between Robert Alexy and Joseph Raz.Wei Feng - 2019 - Archiv Für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 158:305-334.
    Nearly thirty years ago, Robert Alexy in his book The Concept and Validity of Law as well as in other early articles raised non-positivistic arguments in the Continental European tradition against legal positivism in general, which was assumed to be held by, among others, John Austin, Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart. The core thesis of legal positivism that was being discussed among contemporary German jurists, just as with their Anglo- American counterparts, is the claim that there is no necessary connection (...)
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  5. added 2020-06-12
    Kelsen, Hart, and Legal Normativity.Brian Bix - 2018 - Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law / Revija Za Ustavno Teorijo in Filozofijo Prava 34:25-42.
    This article focuses on issues relating to legal normativity, emphasizing the way these matters have been elaborated in the works of Kelsen and Hart and later commentators on their theories. First, in Section 2, the author offers a view regarding the nature of law and legal normativity focusing on Kelsen's work (at least one reasonable reading of it). The argument is that the Basic Norm is presupposed when a citizen chooses to read the actions of legal officials in a normative (...)
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  6. added 2019-08-28
    Hobbes’s Third Jurisprudence: Legal Pragmatism and the Dualist Menace.Benjamin L. S. Nelson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 33 (1).
    This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a ‘third way’ in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential ‘third theories’ of law -- legal pragmatism and legal dualism -- and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s treatment of civil law, and argue (...)
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  7. added 2019-06-20
    Legal Metanormativity: Lessons for and From Constitutivist Accounts in the Philosophy of Law.Kathryn Lindeman - 2019 - In David Plunkett, Kevin Toh & Scott Shapiro (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-104.
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  8. added 2019-04-24
    The Ethics of Proposed Euthanasia Laws in Australia.Thomas F. Burns - 2014 - Dissertation, Monash University
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  9. added 2018-09-30
    Legislative Duty and the Independence of Law.J. H. Bogart - 1987 - Law and Philosophy 6 (2):187 - 203.
    This essay considers the nature of duties incumbent on legislators in virtue of the office itself. I argue that there is no duty for a legislator to enact a criminal law based on morality; there is no duty to incorporate substantive moral conditions into the criminal law; and there is therefore no duty derivable from the nature of the legislative office itself to make conditions of culpability depend on those of moral responsibility. Finally, I argue that the relation between morality (...)
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  10. added 2018-04-26
    Recension de F. Schauer, Penser en Juriste. [REVIEW]Pierre Landou - 2018 - L'Oeil de Minerve:2018.
    Recension de la traduction française de l'ouvrage de F. Schauer, Penser en Juriste, Dalloz, 2018.
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  11. added 2018-04-09
    Introduction: Symposium on Paul Gowder, the Rule of Law in the Real World.Matthew J. Lister - 2018 - St. Louis University Law Journal 62 (2):287-91.
    This is a short introduction to a book symposium on Paul Gowder's recent book, _The Rule of Law in thee Real World_ (Cambridge University Press, 2016). The book symposium will appear in the St. Luis University Law Journal, 62 St. Louis U. L.J., -- (2018), with commentaries on Gowder's book by colleen Murphy, Robin West, Chad Flanders, and Matthew Lister, along with replies by Paul Gowder.
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  12. added 2017-12-17
    Sustainability, Public Health, and the Corporate Duty to Assist.Julian Friedland - 2015 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 34 (2):215-236.
    Several European and North American states encourage or even require, via good Samaritan and duty to rescue laws, that persons assist others in distress. This paper offers a utilitarian and contractualist defense of this view as applied to corporations. It is argued that just as we should sometimes frown on bad Samaritans who fail to aid persons in distress, we should also frown on bad corporate Samaritans who neglect to use their considerable multinational power to undertake disaster relief or to (...)
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  13. added 2017-10-30
    On Tractarian Law.Barry Smith - 1979 - In Markus Aenishänslin (ed.), Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Critical Rationalism. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. pp. 31-35.
    "'It is clear", wrote Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, "that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms" (6.422). But he insisted also that there must be some kind of ethical punishment and reward; "the reward", he tells us, "must be something pleasant, and the punishment something unpleasant" (ibid.). I argue that we can understand what Wittgenstein meant by "reward" and "punishment" by conceiving these notions as elements in a system of interrelated concepts (...)
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  14. added 2017-10-10
    La doctrine environnementaliste face à l'exigence de neutralité axiologique: de l'illusion à la réflexivité.Julien Bétaille - 2016 - Revue Juridique de L'Environnement:20-59.
    Confrontée à l’exigence de neutralité axiologique, comprise comme le rejet de tout jugement de valeur, la doctrine environnementaliste ne fait pas preuve d’une particulière originalité. Elle porte peu d’intérêt à cette exigence, son discours est inéluctablement affecté par les mêmes biais que ceux qui touchent les autres catégories de doctrine et elle y apporte aussi des réponses comparables. Elle met d’une part en place des processus d’objectivation dont la portée est limitée en raison de l’étroitesse de la communauté scientifique du (...)
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  15. added 2017-09-21
    Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - forthcoming - In Kevin Toh, David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press.
    This paper investigates whether different philosophers’ claims about “normativity” are about the same subject or (as recently argued by Derek Parfit) theorists who appear to disagree are really using the term with different meanings, in order to cast disambiguating light on the debates over at least the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of normativity. While I suggest the term may be multiply ambiguous, I also find reasons for optimism about a common subject-matter for metanormative theory. This is supported partly by (...)
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  16. added 2017-09-21
    Quasi-Expressivism About Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory.Stephen Finlay & David Plunkett - forthcoming - In John Gardner, Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, vol. 3. Oxford University Press.
    Speech and thought about what the law is commonly function in practical ways, to guide or assess behavior. These functions have often been seen as problematic for legal positivism in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart. One recent response is to advance an expressivist analysis of legal statements (Toh), which faces its own, familiar problems. This paper advances a rival, positivist-friendly account of legal statements which we call “quasi-expressivist”, explicitly modeled after Finlay’s metaethical theory of moral statements. This consists in a (...)
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  17. added 2017-04-08
    In Defense of Content-Independence.N. P. Adams - 2017 - Legal Theory 23 (3):143-167.
    Discussions of political obligation and political authority have long focused on the idea that the commands of genuine authorities constitute content-independent reasons. Despite its centrality in these debates, the notion of content-independence is unclear and controversial, with some claiming that it is incoherent, useless, or increasingly irrelevant. I clarify content-independence by focusing on how reasons can depend on features of their source or container. I then solve the long-standing puzzle of whether the fact that laws can constitute content-independent reasons is (...)
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  18. added 2017-02-15
    The Methods of Normativity.Hass Binesh - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 30 (1):159.
    This essay is an examination of the relationship between phenomenology and analytic method in the philosophy of law. It proceeds by way of a case study, the requirement of compliance in Raz’s theory of mandatory norms. Proceeding in this way provides a degree of specificity that is otherwise neglected in the relevant literature on method. Drawing on insights from the philosophy of art and cognitive neuroscience, it is argued that the requirement of compliance is beset by a range of epistemological (...)
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  19. added 2016-11-17
    Vorwort.Herlinde Pauer-Studer & Julian Fink - 2014 - In Herlinde Pauer-Studer & Julian Fink (eds.), Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts: Das Rechtsdenken im Nationalsozialismus in Originaltexten. Suhrkamp. pp. 9-13.
    Wie war es möglich? Diese mit Blick auf den Nationalsozialismus und die Zeit von 1933 bis 1945 unausweichliche Frage stellt sich für jede Generation aufs Neue – und auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen. Im Gegensatz zur detaillierten historischen Aufarbeitung der NS-Zeit ist die philosophisch-theoretische Analyse der normativen Grundlagen des NS Systems ein bislang vernachlässigtes Gebietder Forschung. Die hier edierte Sammlung von Originaltextenführender Juristen, Rechtstheoretiker und Rechtsphilosophen, die dem nationalsozialistischen Regime loyal gegenüberstanden und an der rechtlichen Um- und Neugestaltung mitarbeiteten, will diese Lücke (...)
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  20. added 2016-10-31
    Ontology and Reason Giving in Law.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2016 - In Pawel Banas, Adam Dyrda & Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki (eds.), Metaphilosophy of Law. Hart. pp. 147-158.
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  21. added 2016-10-08
    Laws as Conventional Norms.Nicholas Southwood - 2019 - In D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro & K. Toh (eds.), Legal Norms, Ethical Norms: New Essays on Meta-Ethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press.
    A persistent worry concerning conventionalist accounts of law is that such accounts are ill equipped to account for law’s special normativity. I offer a particular kind of conventionalist account that is based on the practice-dependent account of conventional norms I have offered elsewhere and consider whether it is vulnerable to the Normativity Objection. I argue that it isn’t. It can account for all the ways in which law can justly claim to be normative. While there are ways of being normative (...)
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  22. added 2016-04-24
    Breaking Laws to Fix Broken Windows: A Revisionist Take on Order Maintenance Policing.Andrew Ingram - 2014 - Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law 19 (2):112-152.
    Today, there is a family of celebrated police strategies that teach the importance of cracking down on petty crime and urban nuisance as the key to effective crime control. Under the “broken windows” appellation, this strategy is linked in the public mind with New York City and the alleged successes of its police department in reducing the rate of crime over the past two decades. This paper is critical of such order maintenance approaches to policing: I argue that infringements of (...)
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  23. added 2015-11-20
    Law's Authority is Not a Claim to Preemption.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2013 - In Wilfrid J. Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law. Oxford University Press. pp. 51.
    Joseph Raz argues that legal authority includes a claim by the law to replace subjects’ contrary reasons. I reply that this cannot be squared with the existence of choice-of-evils defenses to criminal prosecutions, nor with the view that the law has gaps (which Raz shares). If the function of authority is to get individuals to comply better with reason than they would do if left to their own devices, it would not make sense for law to claim both to pre-empt (...)
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  24. added 2015-11-12
    Law as Plan and Artefact.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2016 - Jurisprudence 7 (2):325-340.
    Scott Shapiro’s theory that law is a social plan is helpful in seeing law essentially as a tool of human creation and as such is sympathetic to understanding law in terms of the social functions it performs, a method I argue for elsewhere. I focus here on two problems with the theory as presented. The planning theory does not adequately explain the persistence of law beyond the utility of those who implement it. Generally, plans can cease to exist as soon (...)
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  25. added 2015-11-12
    Law’s Artifactual Nature: How Legal Institutions Generate Normativity.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2015 - In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds.), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency. Cambridge University Press. pp. 247-266.
    I argue that law is best understood as an institutionalized abstract artifact. Using the ideas of John Searle on institutions and Amie Thomasson on artifacts, I show how the law is capable of generating new reasons for action, arguing against recent work by David Enoch who holds that legal reason-giving is ultimately a form of triggering conditional reasons.
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  26. added 2015-07-20
    Sprawiedliwość a prawo w nauczaniu Jana Pawła II [Justice and Law in the Teaching of John Paul II].Marek Piechowiak - 2014 - Przegląd Tomistyczny 20:209-237.
    The contribution focuses on philosophical issues of justice of positive law in the light of the social teaching of John Paul II. The analyses start with consideration of anthropological foundations of justice as virtue, develop with the reflexion upon justice of actions realizing justice and finally arrive at examination of the criteria of justice of law. -/- It is argued that relations between a human being and goods (ends of actions) form ontological basis of natural law and justice of actions (...)
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  27. added 2015-07-08
    A Theory That Beats the Theory? Lineages, the Growth of Signs, and Dynamic Legal Interpretation.Marcin Matczak - manuscript
    Legal philosophers distinguish between a static and a dynamic interpretation of law. The former assumes that the meaning of the words used in a legal text is set at the moment of its enactment and does not change with time. The latter allows the interpreters to update the meaning and apply a contemporary understanding to the text. The dispute between these competing theories has significant ramifications for social and political life. To take an example, depending on the approach, the term (...)
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  28. added 2015-07-08
    Three Kinds of Intention in Lawmaking.Marcin Matczak - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (6):651-674.
    The nature of legislative intent remains a subject of vigorous debate. Its many participants perceive the intent in different ways. In this paper, I identify the reason for such diverse perceptions: three intentions are involved in lawmaking, not one. The three intentions correspond to the three aspects of a speech act: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary. The dominant approach in legal theory holds that legislative intent is a semantic one. A closer examination shows that it is, in fact, an illocutionary one. (...)
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  29. added 2015-06-05
    Deliberation, Responsibility, and Excusing Mistakes of Law.Alexander A. Guerrero - 2015 - Jurisprudence 6 (1):81-94.
    In ‘Excusing Mistakes of Law’, Gideon Yaffe sets out to ‘vindicate’ the claim ‘that mistakes of law never excuse’ by ‘identifying the truth that is groped for but not grasped by those who assert that ignorance of law is no excuse’. Yaffe does not offer a defence of the claim that mistakes of law never excuse. That claim, Yaffe argues, is false. Yaffe’s article is, rather, an effort to assess what plausible thought might be behind the idea that mistakes of (...)
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  30. added 2015-04-13
    The Paradox of the Normativity of Law.René González de la Vega - 2013 - Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoria Del Derecho 7:63-79.
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  31. added 2014-08-29
    Social Norms, The Invisible Hand, and the Law.Jonny Anomaly & Geoffrey Brennan - 2014 - University of Queensland Law Journal 33 (2).
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  32. added 2014-05-10
    Metanormative Principles and Norm Governed Social Interaction.Berislav Žarnić & Gabriela Bašić - 2014 - Revus 22:105-120.
    Critical examination of Alchourrón and Bulygin’s set-theoretic definition of normative system shows that deductive closure is not an inevitable property. Following von Wright’s conjecture that axioms of standard deontic logic describe perfection-properties of a norm-set, a translation algorithm from the modal to the set-theoretic language is introduced. The translations reveal that the plausibility of metanormative principles rests on different grounds. Using a methodological approach that distinguishes the actor roles in a norm governed interaction, it has been shown that metanormative principles (...)
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  33. added 2014-04-01
    Five Kinds of Perspectives on Legal Institutions.Corrado Roversi - manuscript
    There is at least one immediate sense in which legal discourse is perspectival: it qualifies acts and facts in the world on the basis of rules. Legal concepts are for the most part constituted by rules, both in the sense that rules define these concepts’ semantic content and that, in order to engage with legal practice, we must act according to those rules, not necessarily complying with them but at least having them in mind. This is the distinctive perspective of (...)
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  34. added 2014-03-26
    The Binding Force of Nascent Norms of International Law.Anthony Reeves - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 28 (1):145-166.
    Demonstrating that a developing norm is not yet well established in international law is frequently thought to show that states are not bound by the norm as law. More precisely, showing that a purported international legal norm has only limited support from well-established international legal sources is normally seen as sufficient to rebut an obligation on the part of subjects to comply with the norm in virtue of its legal status. I contend that this view is mistaken. Nascent norms of (...)
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