Jeremy Waldron on law and disagreement

Philosophical Studies 99 (1):111-128 (2000)
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Waldron argues that recent treatments of justice have neglected reasonable disagreement about justice itself. So Waldron offers a procedural account of democratic legitimacy, in which contending views of justice can be brought together to arrive at a decision without deciding which one is correct. However, if there is reasonable disagreement about everything, then this includes his preferred account of legitimacy. On the other hand, it is not clear that Waldron is right to count so much disagreement as reasonable. But then Waldron has not undermined the view he opposes in which some prevailing disagreement about justice is held to be unreasonable
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