Two Objections to Wide-Scoping

Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):251-255 (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Wide-scopers argue that the detachment of intuitively false ‘ought’ claims from hypothetical imperatives is blocked because ‘ought’ takes wide, as opposed to narrow, scope. I present two arguments against this view. The first questions the premise that natural language conditionals are true just in case the antecedent is false. The second shows that intuitively false ‘ought’s can still be detached even WITH wide-scope readings. This weakens the motivation for wide-scoping.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2010-09-02
Latest version: 3 (2010-09-30)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Normativity of Rationality.Kiesewetter, Benjamin

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
302 ( #10,564 of 41,545 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #16,101 of 41,545 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.