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  1. added 2019-04-10
    Kantian Constructivism and the Normativity of Practical Identities.Étienne Brown - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (3):571-590.
    Many neo-Aristotelians argue that practical identities are normative, that is, they provide us with reasons for action and create binding obligations. Kantian constructivists agree with this insight but argue that contemporary Aristotelians fail to fully justify it. Practical identities are normative, Kantian constructivists contend, but their normativity necessarily derives from the normativity of humanity. In this paper, I shed light on this underexplored similarity between neo-Aristotelian and Kantian constructivist accounts of the normativity of practical identities, and argue that both ultimately (...)
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  2. added 2019-01-03
    Individuality and Subjectivity in Kant and Schleiermacher.Jacqueline Mariña - forthcoming - In The Unique, the Singular, and the Individual.
    This paper explores three important criticisms of Kant's ethics by Friedrich Schleiermacher, all having to do with Kant's alleged failure to account for the value of the individual. These are: (1) Kant's formalism precludes him from specifying ends for the will, and without such ends, the moral perfection of the individual, and the genuine appreciation of the other in his or her individuality cannot become my end; (2) Kant cannot provide an adequate metaphysical grounding of the value of the individuals (...)
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  3. added 2018-06-24
    How to Solve Moral Conundrums with Computability Theory.Jongmin Jerome Baek - 2018 - arXiv.
    Various moral conundrums plague population ethics: The Non-Identity Problem, The Procreation Asymmetry, The Repugnant Conclusion, and more. I argue that the aforementioned moral conundrums have a structure neatly accounted for, and solved by, some ideas in computability theory. I introduce a mathematical model based on computability theory and show how previous arguments pertaining to these conundrums fit into the model. This paper proceeds as follows. First, I do a very brief survey of the history of computability theory in moral philosophy. (...)
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  4. added 2018-03-27
    Sobre a recepção do conceito de Verantwortlichkeit de Wilhelm Windelband na antinomia das éticas da convicção e da responsabilidade de Max Weber/The reception of Wilhelm Windelband’s concept of Verantwortlichkeit in Max Weber’s antinomy between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility.Luis F. Roselino - 2013 - Seara Filosófica 7:1-12.
    In the following pages, the main proposal is to indicate how Max Weber has dialogued directly with some prerogatives from Kant’s Critic of practical Reason, following the reception of Wilhelm Windelband’s concept of “responsibility” (Verantwortlichkeit) and his theory of values. In sight of these influences, in this paper will be argued how Weber adherence to the neo-Kantian value concept has made possible a review on the categorical imperatives, which has turned his reading from Kantian philosophy to the proposal of an (...)
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  5. added 2018-03-23
    Kant and the Foundations of Morality. [REVIEW]Samuel Kahn - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (2):403-405.
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  6. added 2018-03-03
    Kant and the Duty to Promote One’s Own Happiness.Samuel Kahn - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    In his discussion of the duty of benevolence in §27 of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that agents have no obligation to promote their own happiness, for ‘this happens unavoidably’ (MS, AA 6:451). In this paper I argue that Kant should not have said this. I argue that Kant should have conceded that agents do have an obligation to promote their own happiness.
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  7. added 2017-11-13
    A Gênese da Ética de Kant: o desenvolvimento moral pré-crítico em sua relação com a teodiceia.Bruno Cunha - 2017 - São Paulo: LiberArs Press.
    Kant‘s moral philosophy is one of the great cornerstones of the Western ethical reflection. The little that is known is that the basic conception on which Kantian ethics was built – videlicet, the concept of autonomy of the will – was developed from the attempt to solve a set of problems of metaphysical and theological character that could only have been overcome through the adoption of a new practical metaphysics. With this in mind, this research is an attempt at a (...)
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  8. added 2017-07-21
    Defending the Possible Consent Interpretation From Actual Objections.Samuel J. M. Kahn - 2014 - Journal of Early Modern Studies 3 (2):88-100.
    In this paper, I defend the possible consent interpretation of Kant’s formula of humanity from objections according to which it has counterintuitive implications. I do this in two ways. First, I argue that to a great extent, the supposed counterintuitive implications rest on a misunderstanding of the possible consent interpretation. Second, I argue that to the extent that these supposed counterintuitive implications do not rest on a misunderstanding of the possible consent interpretation, they are not counterintuitive at all.
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  9. added 2017-06-10
    Autonomy and Morality: A Self-Determination Theory Discussion of Ethics.Alexios Arvanitis - 2017 - New Ideas in Psychology 47:57-61.
    Kantian ethics is based on a metaphysical conception of autonomy that may seem difficult to reconcile with the empirically-based science of psychology. I argue that, although not formally developed, a Self-Determination Theory (SDT) perspective of ethics can broaden the field of Kantian-based moral psychology and specify what it means, motivationally, to have autonomy in the application of a moral norm. More specifically, I argue that this is possible when a moral norm is fully endorsed by the self through a process (...)
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  10. added 2017-04-08
    Heraclitean Critique of Kantian and Enlightenment Ethics Through the Fijian Ethos.Erman Kaplama - 2016 - Cosmos and History 12 (1):143-165.
    Kant makes a much-unexpected confession in a much-unexpected place. In the Criticism of the third paralogism of transcendental psychology of the first Critique Kant accepts the irrefutability of the Heraclitean notion of universal becoming or the transitory nature of all things, admitting the impossibility of positing a totally persistent and self-conscious subject. The major Heraclitean doctrine of panta rhei makes it impossible to conduct philosophical inquiry by assuming a self-conscious subject or “I,” which would potentially be in constant motion like (...)
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  11. added 2017-02-19
    Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law.Pauline Kleingeld - 2017 - Kant-Studien 108 (1):89-115.
    Kant’s most prominent formulation of the Categorical Imperative, known as the Formula of Universal Law (FUL), is generally thought to demand that one act only on maxims that one can will as universal laws without this generating a contradiction. Kant's view is standardly summarized as requiring the 'universalizability' of one's maxims and described in terms of the distinction between 'contradictions in conception' and 'contradictions in the will'. Focusing on the underappreciated significance of the simultaneity condition included in the FUL, I (...)
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  12. added 2016-11-07
    Kant's Self-Legislation Procedure Reconsidered.Adrian M. S. Piper - 2012 - Kant Studies Online 2012 (1):203-277.
    Most published discussions in contemporary metaethics include some textual exegesis of the relevant contemporary authors, but little or none of the historical authors who provide the underpinnings of their general approach. The latter is usually relegated to the historical, or dismissed as expository. Sometimes this can be a useful division of labor. But it can also lead to grave confusion about the views under discussion, and even about whose views are, in fact, under discussion. Elijah Millgram’s article, “Does the Categorical (...)
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  13. added 2016-09-29
    Hypothetical Justifications.Bernd Lahno - 2009 - RMM:67-82.
    A basic conviction in moral non-cognitivism is: only hypothetical norms may be justified. Hartmut Kliemt argues for a moderate variant: there are only hypothetical justifications of norms whether the norms are hypothetical or categorical in kind. In this paper the con- cept of ‘hypothetical justification’ is analyzed. It is argued that hypothetical justifications are not of the kind that we should look for in normative ethics.
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  14. added 2016-09-27
    Making Sense of Categorical Imperatives.Bernd Lahno - 2006 - Analyse & Kritik 28 (1):71-82.
    Naturalism, as Binmore understands the term, is characterized by a scientific stance on moral behavior. Binmore claims that a naturalistic account of morality necessarily goes with the conviction “that only hypothetical imperatives make any sense”. In this paper it is argued that this claim is mistaken. First, as Hume’s theory of promising shows, naturalism in the sense of Binmore is very well compatible with acknowledging the importance of categorical imperatives in moral practice. Moreover, second, if Binmore’s own theory of moral (...)
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  15. added 2016-03-06
    The Normative Force of Promising.Jack Woods - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 6:77-101.
    Why do promises give rise to reasons? I consider a quadruple of possibilities which I think will not work, then sketch the explanation of the normativity of promising I find more plausible—that it is constitutive of the practice of promising that promise-breaking implies liability for blame and that we take liability for blame to be a bad thing. This effects a reduction of the normativity of promising to conventionalism about liability together with instrumental normativity and desire-based reasons. This is important (...)
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  16. added 2015-10-19
    The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):694-726.
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  17. added 2015-09-17
    The Interconnection Between Willing and Believing for Kant’s and Kantian Ethics.Samuel Kahn - 2014 - International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):143-157.
    In this paper I look at the connection between willing and believing for Kant’s and Kantian ethics. I argue that the two main formulations of the categorical imperative are relativized to agents according to their beliefs. I then point out three different ways in which Kant or a present-day Kantian might defend this position. I conclude with some remarks about the contrast between Kant’s legal theory and his ethical theory.
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  18. added 2014-11-20
    Autonomous Reboot: The Challenges of Artificial Moral Agency and the Ends of Machine Ethics.Jeffrey White - manuscript
    Ryan Tonkens (2009) has issued a seemingly impossible challenge, to articulate a comprehensive ethical framework within which artificial moral agents (AMAs) satisfy a Kantian inspired recipe - both "rational" and "free" - while also satisfying perceived prerogatives of Machine Ethics to create AMAs that are perfectly, not merely reliably, ethical. Challenges for machine ethicists have also been presented by Anthony Beavers and Wendell Wallach, who have pushed for the reinvention of traditional ethics in order to avoid "ethical nihilism" due to (...)
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  19. added 2014-03-27
    Kant’s Derivation of the Formula of the Categorical Imperative: How to Get It Right.Jacqueline Mariña - 1998 - Kant-Studien 89 (2):167-178.
    This paper explores the charge by Bruce Aune and Allen Wood that a gap exists in Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative. I show that properly understood, no such gap exists, and that the deduction of the Categorical Imperative is successful as it stands.
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  20. added 2014-03-06
    The End‐Relational Theory of ‘Ought’ and the Weight of Reasons.Daan Evers - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (3):405-417.
    Stephen Finlay analyses ‘ought’ in terms of probability. According to him, normative ‘ought's are statements about the likelihood that an act will realize some (contextually supplied) end. I raise a problem for this theory. It concerns the relation between ‘ought’ and the balance of reasons. ‘A ought to Φ’ seems to entail that the balance of reasons favours that A Φ-es, and vice versa. Given Finlay's semantics for ‘ought’, it also makes sense to think of reasons and their weight in (...)
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  21. added 2013-11-06
    Merciless Justice: The Dialectic of the Universal and the Particular in Kantian Ethics, Competitive Games, and Bhagavad Gītā.Michael Yudanin - 2013 - Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion 18:124-143.
    Morality is traditionally understood as comprised of two components: justice and mercy. The first component, justice, the universal component of the form, is frequently seen as foundational for any moral system – which poses a challenge of explaining the second component, mercy, the particular component of content. Kantian ethics provides an example of this approach. After formulating his universalist theory of ethics in the Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals and further developing it in the Critique of practical reason, he (...)
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  22. added 2012-07-12
    The Harm Principle Vs. Kantian Criteria for Ensuring Fair, Principled and Just Criminalisation.Dennis J. Baker - 2008 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 33 (66):66-99.
    In this paper, I consider Ripstein and Dan-Cohen's critiques of the 'harm principle'. Ripstein and Dan-Cohen have asserted that the harm principle should be jettisoned, because it allegedly fails to provide a rationale for criminalising certain harmless wrongs that ought to be criminalised. They argue that Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative and his concept of 'external freedom' are better equipped for ensuring that criminalisation decisions meet the requirements of fairness. Per contra, I assert that Kant's deontological theory is (...)
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  23. added 2011-02-28
    Slaves of the Passions? On Schroeder's New Humeanism. [REVIEW]Alex Gregory - 2009 - Ratio 22 (2):250-257.
    Critical notice of Mark Schroeder's Slaves of the Passions.
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  24. added 2010-09-02
    Two Objections to Wide-Scoping.Daan Evers - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):251-255.
    Wide-scopers argue that the detachment of intuitively false ‘ought’ claims from hypothetical imperatives is blocked because ‘ought’ takes wide, as opposed to narrow, scope. I present two arguments against this view. The first questions the premise that natural language conditionals are true just in case the antecedent is false. The second shows that intuitively false ‘ought’s can still be detached even WITH wide-scope readings. This weakens the motivation for wide-scoping.
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