Eine grüblerische Argutation? Kant und Hegel zum Sein als Position

In Georgi Donev, Silviya Kristeva, Atanaska Cholakova & Reinhard Hesse (eds.), Back to Metaphysics. Blagoevgrad: University Press “Neofit Rilski”. pp. 259-277 (2016)
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Abstract
Kant claims that existence is not a real predicate that can be added to the concept of a thing, but that it is the mere positing of the thing. Kant considers this thesis to be evident for itself and therefore thinks that its rejection is the result of an " over-subtle argumentation ". In this paper I will show that the claim that existence is the positing of the content of mental concepts, far from being evident, rests on numerous philosophical presuppositions. In this regard, I will defend the claim that the thought experiment of the nothingness of the existing world is what leads Kant to conceive existence as absolute positing. Furthermore, I will try to show that it is possible to accept the claim that existence is not a real predicate, without having to accept at the same time that it is the positing of the concept. With this purpose in view, I will focus specifically on Hegel´s claim that, in the general frame of a radically antiempiricist and coherentist epistemology, being resolves and dissolves into the determinate concept of the objects of knowledge.
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