Consciousness and Intentionality in Anton Marty’s Lecture on Descriptive Psychology

In Hamid Taieb & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Mind and Language. On the Philosophy of Anton Marty. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 23-40 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Abstract: In this study, I propose to examine Marty’s reconstruction of the general framework in which Brentano develops his theory of consciousness. My starting point is the formulation, at the very beginning of the second chapter of the second book of Brentano’s Psychology, of two theses on mental phenomena, which constitute the basis of Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects. In the second part, I examine the objection of infinite regress raised against Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects and Marty’s interpretation of Brentano’s theory of the unity of consciousness. The third part bears on the important distinction between implicit and explicit consciousness, which Brentano introduces in his lectures on descriptive psychology. Here, I analyse Marty’s principle of individuation in light of the modifications which Brentano made to his theory of consciousness after the publication of his Psychology in 1874. The last section is an examination of Marty’s conception of consciousness as self-consciousness with respect to his principle of individuation.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FISCAI-5
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-02-15
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-11-18

Total views
153 ( #32,732 of 2,425,820 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #30,353 of 2,425,820 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.