Results for 'self-consciousness'

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  1. Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.
    The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I (...)
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  2. Concerning Cattle: Behavioral and Neuroscientific Evidence for Pain, Desire, and Self-Consciousness.Gary Comstock - 2017 - In Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson & Tyler Doggett (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 139-169.
    Should people include beef in their diet? This chapter argues that the answer is “no” by reviewing what is known and not known about the presence in cattle of three psychological traits: pain, desire, and self-consciousness. On the basis of behavioral and neuroanatomical evidence, the chapter argues that cattle are sentient beings who have things they want to do in the proximal future, but they are not self-conscious. The piece rebuts three important objections: that cattle have injury information but (...)
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  3. "The Paradox of Self-Consciousness" by José Luis Burmùdez. [REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2001 - Philosophical Review 1 (4):624.
    What José Luis Bermúdez calls the paradox of self-consciousness is essentially the conflict between two claims: (1) The capacity to use first-personal referential devices like “I” must be explained in terms of the capacity to think first-person thoughts. (2) The only way to explain the capacity for having a certain kind of thought is by explaining the capacity for the canonical linguistic expression of thoughts of that kind. (Bermúdez calls this the “Thought-Language Principle”.) The conflict between (1) and (2) (...)
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  4. Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism.Arvid Båve - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.
    It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type (...)
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  5. The Moral Insignificance of Self‐Consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    In this paper, I examine the claim that self-consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self-conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but I argue it is false. I consider two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best-known arguments relevant to self-consciousness's significance take the indirect route. I examine them and argue that in various ways they depend (...)
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  6. Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity.Kristina Musholt - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):63-89.
    This paper distinguishes between implicit self-related information and explicit self-representation and argues that the latter is required for self-consciousness. It is further argued that self-consciousness requires an awareness of other minds and that this awareness develops over the course of an increasingly complex perspectival differentiation, during which information about self and other that is implicit in early forms of social interaction becomes redescribed into an explicit format.
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  7. Who Am I in Out of Body Experiences? Implications From OBEs for the Explanandum of a Theory of Self-Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):183-197.
    Contemporary theories of self-consciousness typically begin by dividing experiences of the self into types, each requiring separate explanation. The stereotypical case of an out of body experience may be seen to suggest a distinction between the sense of oneself as an experiencing subject, a mental entity, and a sense of oneself as an embodied person, a bodily entity. Point of view, in the sense of the place from which the subject seems to experience the world, in this case is (...)
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  8. Self-Consciousness.George Bealer - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
    Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving “realizations” rather than mental properties and relations themselves. Or else these definitions are circular. The only way to save functional definitions is to expunge the standard functionalist requirement that mental properties be second-order and to accept that they are first-order. But even the resulting “ideological” functionalism, which aims only at conceptual clarification, fails unless (...)
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  9. Editor's Introduction: Transcending Self-Consciousness.Gregory Nixon - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (7):889-1022.
    What is this thing we each call “I” and consider the eye of consciousness, that which beholds objects in the world and objects in our minds? This inner perceiver seems to be the same I who calls forth memories or images at will, the I who feels and determines whether to act on those feelings or suppress them, as well as the I who worries and makes plans and attempts to avoid those worries and act on those plans. Am I (...)
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  10. The Self-Consciousness Argument: Why Tooley's Criticisms Fail.George Bealer - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307.
    Ontological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can be defined wholly in terms of the general pattern of interaction of ontologically prior realizations. Ideological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can only be defined nonreductively, in terms of the general pattern of their interaction with one another. My Self-consciousness Argument establishes: ontological functionalism is mistaken because its proposed definitions wrongly admit realizations into the contents of self-consciousness; ideological functionalism is the only viable alternative for functionalists. Michael (...)
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  11.  53
    What Is Self-Consciousness?Bruya Brian - 2012 - In Labirinti della mente: Visioni del mondo. Siena, Italy: Società bibliografica toscana. pp. 223-233.
    In this article, I delineate seven aspects of the process of self-consciousness in order to demonstrate that when any of the aspects is compromised, self-consciousness goes away while consciousness persists. I then suggest that the psychological phenomenon of flow is characterized by a loss of self-consciousness. The seven aspects are: 1) implicit awareness that the person and the self are identical; 2) awareness of an event or circumstance in the world internal or external to the person; 3) (...)
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  12. Primitive Self-Consciousness and Avian Cognition.Andy Lamey - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):486-510.
    Recent work in moral theory has seen the refinement of theories of moral standing, which increasingly recognize a position of intermediate standing between fully self-conscious entities and those which are merely conscious. Among the most sophisticated concepts now used to denote such intermediate standing is that of primitive self-consciousness, which has been used to more precisely elucidate the moral standing of human newborns. New research into the structure of the avian brain offers a revised view of the cognitive abilities (...)
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  13. Recognition, Skepticism and Self-Consciousness in the Young Hegel.Italo Testa - 2009 - Fenomenologia E Società 32 (2):117-132.
    The theory of recognition arises within Hegel's confrontation with epistemological skepticism and aims at responding to the questions raised by modern skepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. This is possible to the extent that the theory of recognition is the guiding thread of a critique of the modern foundational theory of knowledge and, at the same time, the point of departure for an alternative approach. In this article I will dwell (...)
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  14. Functionalism and Self-Consciousness.Mark McCullagh - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499.
    I offer a philosophically well-motivated solution to a problem that George Bealer has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem is that there seems to be no way to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental-state predicates occur within the scopes of mental-state predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could (...)
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  15.  84
    The Paradox of Self-Consciousness.Adam Morton - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):727-730.
    I discuss Bermudez' minimalist approach to self-consciousness approvingly, connecting it with other positions in philosophy and trying to separate it from ideas about non-conceptual content.
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  16. Empirical Consciousness Explained: Self-Affection, (Self-)Consciousness and Perception in the B Deduction.Corey W. Dyck - 2006 - Kantian Review 11:29-54.
    Few of Kant’s doctrines are as difficult to understand as that of self-affection. Its brief career in the published literature consists principally in its unheralded introduction in the Transcendental Aesthetic and unexpected re-appearance at a key moment in the Deduction chapter in the B edition of the first Critique. Kant’s commentators, confronted with the difficulty of this doctrine, have naturally resorted to various strategies of clarification, ranging from distinguishing between empirical and transcendental self-affection, divorcing self-affection from the claims of self-knowledge (...)
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  17. Comment: Minimal Conditions for the Simplest Form of Self-Consciousness.Adrian J. T. Smith - 2010 - In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Henningsen (eds.), The embodied self: Dimensions, coherence, disorders. Schattauer.
    Commentary on: Olaf Blanke, Thomas Metzinger, Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 13, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 7-13, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003.
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  18. Phantom Body as Bodily Self-Consciousness.Przemysław Nowakowski - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (1):135–149.
    In the article, I propose that the body phantom is a phenomenal and functional model of one’s own body. This model has two aspects. On the one hand, it functions as a tacit sensory representation of the body that is at the same time related to the motor aspects of body functioning. On the other hand, it also has a phenomenal aspect as it constitutes the content of conscious bodily experience. This sort of tacit, functional and sensory model is related (...)
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  19. Self, Belonging, and Conscious Experience: A Critique of Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Timothy Lane - 2015 - In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 103-140.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made to explain seemingly (...)
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  20. Phenomenal Consciousness with Infallible Self-Representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.
    In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental (...)
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  21.  75
    Evolutionary Scenario Linking the Nature of Self-Consciousness to Anxiety Management (Dec 2017).Christophe Menant - manuscript
    Anxiety is a main contributor to human psychological sufferings. Its evolutionary sources are generally related to alert signals for coping with adverse or unexpected situations [Steiner, 2002] or to hunter-gatherer emotions mismatched with today environments [Horwitz & Wakefield, 2012]. We propose here another evolutionary perspective that links human anxiety to an evolutionary nature of self-consciousness. That approach introduces new relations between mental health and human mind. The proposed evolutionary scenario starts with the performance of primate identification with conspecifics [de (...)
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  22. Proposal for an Evolutionary Approach to Self-Consciousness (Feb 8th 2014).Christophe Menant - manuscript
    It is pretty obvious to most of us that self-consciousness is a product of evolution. But its nature is unknown. We propose here a scenario addressing a possible evolutionary nature of self-consciousness covering the segment linking pre-human primates to humans. The scenario is based on evolutions of representations and of inter-subjectivity that could have taken place within the minds of our pre-human ancestors . We begin by situating self-consciousness relatively to other aspects of human consciousness. With the (...)
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  23.  10
    Relocating the Figure of Jikaku (Self-Consciousness) in Nishida’s Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness (1917).Montserrat Crespin Perales - 2012 - In Toru Arakawa (ed.), Practicing Japanese Philosophy. Mind and Activity. Tokio, Japón: pp. 34-57.
    Relocating the figure of Jikaku (Self-Consciousness) in Nishida’s Intuition and Reflection in Self-consciousness.
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  24. Evolution of Representations. From Basic Life to Self-Representation and Self-Consciousness (2006).Christophe Menant - manuscript
    The notion of representation is at the foundation of cognitive sciences and is used in theories of mind and consciousness. Other notions like ‘embodiment’, 'intentionality‘, 'guidance theory' or ‘biosemantics’ have been associated to the notion of representation to introduce its functional aspect. We would like to propose here that a conception of 'usage related' representation eases its positioning in an evolutionary context, and opens new areas of investigation toward self-representation and self-consciousness. The subject is presented in five parts:Following an (...)
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  25. Is Consciousness Reflexively Self‐Aware? A Buddhist Analysis.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):389-401.
    This article examines contemporary Buddhist defences of the idea that consciousness is reflexively aware or self-aware. Call this the Self-Awareness Thesis. A version of this thesis was historically defended by Dignāga but rejected by Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika Buddhists. Prāsaṅgikas historically advanced four main arguments against this thesis. In this paper I consider whether some contemporary defence of the Self-Awareness Thesis can withstand these Prāsaṅgika objections. A problem is that contemporary defenders of the Self-Awareness Thesis have subtly different accounts with different assessment (...)
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  26. Evolution and Mirror Neurons. An Introduction to the Nature of Self-Consciousness (2005).Christophe Menant - 2005 - Dissertation, Copenhagen TSC 2005
    Self-consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people today disagree with the evolutionary history of humans. But the nature of self-consciousness is still to be explained, and the story of evolution has rarely been used as a framework for studies on consciousness during the 20th century. This last point may be due to the fact that modern study of consciousness came up at a time where dominant philosophical movements were not in favor of evolutionist theories (Cunningham 1996). Research (...)
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  27. Evolutionary Advantages of Inter-Subjectivity and Self-Consciousness Through Improvements of Action Programs (2010).Christophe Menant - 2010 - Dissertation, Tucson TSC 2010
    Evolutionary advantages of consciousness and intersubjectivity are part of current philosophical debates on the nature of consciousness. Both are linked and intersubjectivity is sometimes considered as a form of consciousness [1]. Regarding the evolution of consciousness, studies tend to focus on phenomenal consciousness [2]. We would like here to bring the focus on self-consciousness and continue the build up of a corresponding evolutionary scenario. We also propose to introduce a possible evolutionary link between self-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Our (...)
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  28. Evolution of Representations and Intersubjectivity as Sources of the Self. An Introduction to the Nature of Self-Consciousness (2006).Christophe Menant - 2006 - Dissertation, Oxford ASSC 10
    It is agreed by most people that self-consciousness is the result of an evolutionary process, and that representations may have played an important role in that process. We would like to propose here that some evolutionary stages can highlight links existing between representations and the notion of self, opening a possible path to the nature of self-consciousness. Our starting point is to focus on representations as usage oriented items for the subject that carries them. These representations are about (...)
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  29. Meaning Generation and Self-Consciousness: Neurophilosophical Applications of an Evolutionary Scenario? (2015)..Christophe Menant - 2015 - Dissertation, Lomonosov Moscow State University. Department of Philosophy
    The nature of human mind has been an open question for more than 2000 years and it is still today a mystery. There has been during the last 30 years a renewed interest from science and philosophy on that subject. Among the existing research domains is neurophilosophy, an interdisciplinary study of neuroscience and philosophy looking at neuronal aspects of access consciousness, of phenomenal consciousness and at functional aspects of consciousness. We propose here to look if self-consciousness could have a (...)
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  30. Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location.Frederic Peters - 2010 - Psychological Research.
    At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes action-output (...)
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  31. The Unconscious, Consciousness, and the Self Illusion.Michele Di Francesco & Massimo Marraffa - 2013 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 6 (1):10-22.
    In this article we explore the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious as it has taken shape within contemporary cognitive science - meaning by this term the mature cognitive science, which has fully incorporated the results of the neurosciences. In this framework we first compare the neurocognitive unconscious with the Freudian one, emphasizing the similarities and above all the differences between the two constructs. We then turn our attention to the implications of the centrality of unconscious processes in cognitive science (...)
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  32.  70
    Consciousness Results When Communication Modifies the Form of Self-Estimated Fitness.J. H. van Hateren - manuscript
    The origin and development of consciousness is poorly understood. Although it is clearly a naturalistic phenomenon evolved through Darwinian evolution, explaining it in terms of physicochemical, neural, or symbolic mechanisms remains elusive. Here I propose that two steps had to be taken in its evolution. First, living systems evolved an intrinsic goal-directedness by internalizing Darwinian fitness as a self-estimated fitness. The self-estimated fitness participates in a feedback loop that effectively produces intrinsic meaning in the organism. Second, animals with advanced nervous (...)
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  33.  83
    Self-Consciousness and the Critique of the Subject: Hegel, Heidegger, and the Poststructuralists, by Simon Lumsden: New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, Pp. Xviii + 265, US$45. [REVIEW]David Kolb - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):402-405.
    A review of Simon Lumsden's book on self consciousness in Hegel and in Postmodern authors.
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  34. Olivi on Consciousness and Self-Knowledge: The Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Mind's Reflexivity.Susan Brower-Toland - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 1 (1).
    The theory of mind that medieval philosophers inherit from Augustine is predicated on the thesis that the human mind is essentially self-reflexive. This paper examines Peter John Olivi's (1248-1298) distinctive development of this traditional Augustinian thesis. The aim of the paper is three-fold. The first is to establish that Olivi's theory of reflexive awareness amounts to a theory of phenomenal consciousness. The second is to show that, despite appearances, Olivi rejects a higher-order analysis of consciousness in favor of a same-order (...)
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  35. The Child in Time: Temporal Concepts and Self-Consciousness in the Development of Episodic Memory.Teresa McCormack & Christoph Hoerl - 2001 - In C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. pp. 203-227.
    Investigates the roles of temporal concepts and self-consciousness in the development of episodic memory. According to some theorists, types of long-term memory differ primarily in the degree to which they involve or are associated with self-consciousness (although there may be no substantial differences in the kind of event information that they deliver). However, a known difficulty with this view is that it is not obvious what motivates introducing self-consciousness as the decisive factor in distinguishing between types of (...)
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  36. Inner Speech as a Mediator of Self-Awareness, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge: An Hypothesis.Alain Morin & James Everett - 1990 - New Ideas in Psychology 8 (3):337-56.
    Little is known with regard to the precise cognitive tools the self uses in acquiring and processing information about itself. In this article, we underline the possibility that inner speech might just represent one such cognitive process. Duval and Wicklund’s theory of self-awareness and the selfconsciousness, and self-knowledge body of work that was inspired by it are reviewed, and the suggestion is put forward that inner speech parallels the state of self-awareness, is more frequently used among highly self-conscious persons, and (...)
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  37. Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):319-346.
    Many recent discussions of self-consciousness and self-knowledge assume that there are only two kinds of accounts available to be taken on the relation between the so-called first-order (conscious) states and subjects' awareness or knowledge of them: a same-order, or reflexive view, on the one hand, or a higher-order one, on the other. I maintain that there is a third kind of view that is distinctively different from these two options. The view is important because it can accommodate and make (...)
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  38. History of Exposure to Self-Focusing Stimuli As a Developmental Antecedent of Self-Consciousness.Alain Morin - 1997 - Psychological Reports 80:1252-1254.
    Szmimary.—The present report investigated the question of how individual differences in self-consciousness devdop. Rimé and LeBon proposed that high self-consciousness follows a history of frequent exposure to selffocusing stimuli, i.e., mirrors, audiences, audio and video devices, and cameras. To explore this hypothesis private and public self-consciousness and past exposure to self-focusing stimuli were assessed in 438 subjects. Analysis indicated that history of frequent exposure to self-focusing stimuli is significantly but weakly related to high private self-consciousness in (...)
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  39. History of Exposure to Audiences as a Developmental Antecedent of Public Self-Consciousness.Alain Morin & Lisa Graig - 2000 - Current Research in Social Psychology 5 (3):33-46.
    Little is know about factors that influence the development of public self-consciousness. One potential factor is exposure to audiences: being repeatedly aware of one's object status could create a high disposition to focus on public self-aspects. To explore this hypothesis public self-consciousness was assessed in two groups of subjects: 62 professors and actors (high exposure to audiences) and 39 people without audience experience. Analysis show that significant differences exist for public self-consciousness in men only. Also, history of (...)
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  40. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: Inner Games and Alternative Realities.J. Shotter - 1983 - In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press.
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  41. The Self-Referential Aspect of Consciousness.Cosmin Visan - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 8 (11):864-880.
    Following the phenomenology that is revealed by the emergent structure of consciousness, the path will lead to the acknowledgement of consciousness having a self-referential aspect. By following phenomenological clues, properties of self-reference will be revealed. The two most prominent properties of self-reference will be shown to be inclusion and transcendence that will be shown to be found everywhere in the phenomenology of consciousness. Also, self-reference will turn out to be unformalizable, this imposing limits on what a theory of consciousness can (...)
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  42.  95
    Performances of Self-Awareness Used to Explain the Evolutionary Advantages of Consciousness (2004).Christophe Menant - 2004 - Dissertation, Tucson TSC 2004
    The question about evolution of consciousness has been addressed so far as possible selectional advantage related to consciousness ("What evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism ? "). But evidencing an adaptative explanation of consciousness has proven to be very difficult. Reason for that being the complexity of consciousness. We take here a different approach on subject by looking at possible selectional advantages related to the performance of Self Awareness that appeared during evolution millions of years (...)
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  43.  83
    Consciousness as Presence: An Exploration of the Illusion of Self.Charles Kedric Fink - 2013 - Buddhist Studies Review 30 (1):113-128.
    Buddhism teaches that ‘self’ as a substantial, enduring entity is an illusion. But for self to be an illusion there must be something in our experience that is misinterpreted as self. What is this? The notion of an experiential self plays an important role in phenomenological investigations of conscious experience. Does the illusion of self consist in mistaking a purely experiential self for a substantial self? I argue against this and locate the source of the illusion in time-consciousness. It is (...)
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  44.  49
    Thinking Toes...? Proposing a Reflective Order of Embodied Self-Consciousness in the Aesthetic Subject.Camille Buttingsrud - 2015 - Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics 7:115-123.
    Philosophers investigating the experiences of the dancing subject (Sheets-Johnstone 1980, 2009, 2011, 2012; Parviainen 1998; Legrand 2007, 2013; Legrand & Ravn 2009; Montero 2013; Foultier & Roos 2013) unearth vast variations of embodied consciousness and cognition in performing body experts. The traditional phenomenological literature provides us with descriptions and definitions of reflective self-consciousness as well as of pre-reflective bodily absorption, but when it comes to the states of self-consciousness dance philosophers refer to as thinking in movement and a (...)
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  45. Consciousness and Agency: The Importance of Self-Organized Action.E. Gonzalez, M. Broens & Pim Haselager - 2004 - Networks 3:103-13.
    Abstract. Following the tracks of Ryle and based upon the theory of complex systems, we shall develop a characterization of action-based consciousness as an embodied, embedded, selforganized process in which action and dispositions occupy a special place. From this perspective, consciousness is not a unique prerogative of humans, but it is spread all around, throughout the evolution of life. We argue that artificial systems such as robots currently lack the genuine embodied embeddedness that allows the type of self-organization that is (...)
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  46. What Reason Could There Be to Believe in Pre-Reflective Bodily Self-Consciousness.Adrian Alsmith - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in interaction: The role of the natural and social environment in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Press.
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  47. The Self-Consciousness Argument : Functionalism and the Corruption of Intentional Content.George Bealer - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter I argue that there is such a barrier created by self-conscious intentional states—conscious intentional states that are about one’s own conscious intentional states. As we will see, however, this result is entirely compatible with a scientific theory of mind, and, in fact, there is an elegant non-reductive framework in which just such a theory may be pursued.
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  48.  73
    "I Think ...." Kant on Self-Consciousness.Jens Saugstad - 2002 - In Audun Øfsti, Peter Ulrich & Truls Wyller (eds.), Indexicality and Idealism Ii. The Self in Philosophical Perspective. Mentis. pp. 103-125.
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  49. Self-Consciousness and Immunity.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):78-99.
    Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, we (...)
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  50.  78
    Robert P. Pippin, Hegel on Self-Consciousness. Desire and Death in The Phenomenology of Spirit. [REVIEW]Elisa Magrì - 2012 - Historia Philosophica (10):102-4.
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