Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value

Social Theory and Practice 34 (4):517-32 (2008)
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Abstract
In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. The main idea I wish to bring out and defend is that Moore was insufficiently attentive to how distinctive his conception of intrinsic value was, as compared with those of the writers he discussed, and that such inattentiveness skewed his understanding of the positions of others that he discussed and dismissed. My way into this issue is by examining the charge of inconsistency that Moore levels at the qualitative hedonism outlined by J. S. Mill in Utilitarianism. Along the way I suggest that there are a number of ways in which Moore was unfair in rejecting qualitative hedonism as inconsistent. I close by relating the issues that arise in discussion of Moore to contemporary debates on value and reasons.
ISBN(s)
0037-802X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FLEMMA
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First archival date: 2010-11-05
Latest version: 5 (2016-02-24)
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2009-07-21

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