A defence of constructionism: philosophy as conceptual engineering

Metaphilosophy 42 (3):282-304 (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This article offers an account and defence of constructionism, both as a metaphilosophical approach and as a philosophical methodology, with references to the so-called maker's knowledge tradition. Its main thesis is that Plato's “user's knowledge” tradition should be complemented, if not replaced, by a constructionist approach to philosophical problems in general and to knowledge in particular. Epistemic agents know something when they are able to build (reproduce, simulate, model, construct, etc.) that something and plug the obtained information into the correct network of relations that account for it. Their epistemic expertise increases with the scope and depth of the questions that they are able to ask and answer. Thus, constructionism deprioritises mimetic, passive, and declarative knowledge that something is the case, in favour of poietic, interactive, and practical knowledge of something being the case. Metaphilosophically, constructionism suggests adding conceptual engineering to conceptual analysis as a fundamental method
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FLOADO-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-06-17
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-04-05

Total views
247 ( #26,499 of 64,181 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
55 ( #13,602 of 64,181 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.