Deflationary Pluralism about Motivating Reasons

In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press (2018)
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This paper takes a closer look at ordinary thought and talk about motivating reasons, in an effort to better understand how it works. This is an important first step in understanding whether—and if so, how—such thought and talk should inform or constrain our substantive theorizing. One of the upshots is that ordinary judgments about motivating reasons are at best a partial and defeasible guide to what really matters, and that so-called factualists, propositionalists, and statists are all partly right, as well as partly wrong, when it comes to the question of what motivating reasons “are”.
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Practical Reality.Dancy, Jonathan

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