Rationally held ‘P, but I fully believe ~P and I am not equivocating’

Philosophical Studies 173 (2):309-313 (2016)
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Abstract
One of Moore’s paradoxical sentence types is ‘P, but I believe ~P’. Mooreans have assumed that all tokens of that sentence type are absurd in some way: epistemically, pragmatically, semantically, or assertively. And then they proceed to debate what the absurdity really is. I argue that if one has the appropriate philosophical views, then one can rationally assert tokens of that sentence type, and one can be epistemically reasonable in the corresponding compound belief as well
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Archival date: 2015-04-12
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