Tiempo lógico y tiempo real

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Abstract
Aristotle describes time as continuous (cf. Phys. 219a 10-15). We argue here, first, that the time's continuity and magnitude's continuity differ, even though time's continuity depends on magnitude: actually a magnitude can be divided, that is, can fail to be continuous, but not time: time can be never actually divided, because an actual division in time would imply something like a real point in which time is denied, and that is impossible according to Aristotle (cf. Phys. 251b 10-28). The only divisions that time as continuous would admit are those made by the soul, i. e. only logical divisions. Secondly, we indicate that time could be considered from two perspectives: a logical –or, in a way, mathematical–, and other in the strict sense real. These two perspectives would be suggested by the distinction of meanings that Aristotle makes about the now (cf. Phys. 219b 10-13). The ontological perspective would show certain nexus between the Aristotle's analysis of time with those of contemporary Physics.
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Archival date: 2019-09-16
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