Hegel and the Problem of Particularity in Moral Judgment

Women's Philosophy Review 22:58-79 (1999)
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Abstract
Barbara Herman's account of rules of moral salience goes far in explaining how Kantian moral theory can integrate historically emergent normative criticisms such as that offered by feminists. The ethical motives that initially lead historical agents to expand our moral categories, however, are often at odds with Kant's (and Herman's) theory of moral motivations. I argue that Hegel offers a more accurate account of ethical motivation under oppressive conditions.
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Archival date: 2015-06-14
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